

MARO Project
Scenario Number 2
Mass Starvation in Country Y
A Land-Locked Country in Central Asia

19 September 2009

MARO Project
Mass Atrocity Response Operations
COMMANDER'S ESTIMATE

I. Commander's Estimate Mission Analysis

A. Facts relating to Mass Atrocity Response Operations in Central Asia Country "Y"
Scenario

1. Country Y is land-locked
2. Terrain is extremely mountainous with wide valleys in the center of the country
3. Country Y is has several major river valleys
4. 60 % of the population lives within the valley near the capital
5. The remaining 40% population lives in river valleys throughout the country
6. Most ground lines of communications (GLOC) follow rivers
7. Country Y is heavily dependent on hydroelectric power
8. Electrical power supply is sporadic in winter
9. Country Y has underdeveloped internal infrastructure
10. There are fewer than 10 airports that could support military a/c operations
11. Country Y exports comprise x% of China's energy imports
12. Country Y exports comprise x% of Europe's energy imports
13. Country Y imports x% of food (corn & rice) from Russia and India
14. Country Y is not member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization
15. Country Y was a member of NATO Partnership for Peace program (currently suspended)
16. Country Y's monarchy has been in place for 50 years (2 generations)
17. Only the Iranian and North Korean embassies to country Y remain open
18. UN has an observer mission in country Y capital with very limited mobility
19. Government of Y (GOY) has total control of state media and will not allow any outside reporting
20. GOY controls and monitors all internet and cell phone access
21. GOY maintains stringent border control
22. GOY has an extensive informer network throughout the population
23. Y has a large conventional military of about million men
24. Y has a functioning integrated air-defense system
25. Y military has limited SO capability/training

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B. Assumptions for Mass Atrocity Response Operations Scenario #2

1. Neighboring nations will allow US over flight, APOD and GLOC access
2. Neighboring states will allow stockpiling of enough supplies to support intervention for the duration of the first winter
3. Domestic hydroelectric power *could* be supplied all year
4. Energy resource exports will be diminished by intervention operations
5. Energy markets will absorb and make good the loss of Y's market share
6. That the Department of State's long-term strategy for this region's underscores its importance to the USG
7. Existing economic, diplomatic and cyber sanctions will remain in effect.
8. That direct political/diplomatic arrangements have been established that may be impacted by this mass atrocity
9. That specific immediate political/diplomatic initiatives are directly affected by this operation.
10. That the USG has coordinated the capability and commitment within its own ranks to establish a return to pre-conflict sovereignty or its post-conflict variant for this nation at the center of this operation.
11. That the appropriate USG agencies have prepared and are able to deploy to rebuild the society based on categories established by the Department of State's Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization's Essential Task List.
12. That the USG has established political/military relationships with partner nations for this intervention.
13. Nations supporting intervention will continue support despite higher energy prices
14. SCO will not hinder intervention
15. NATO will support intervention
16. Intervener's information operations will be able to shape international support for intervention before it starts
17. Intervener IO will continue to isolate GOY from international community throughout the operation
18. Intervener's IO will help solidify international support for preventative sanctions and active intervention if needed
19. Combat operations may be required to force entry into the country and to stop state repression while protecting starving people.
20. GOY will resist sanctions politically and intervention militarily
21. US military will lead a coalition of other nations determined to avoid mass atrocity or intervene to stop it
22. Participating countries will allow their forces to conduct offensive operations as well as defensive and stability operations
23. This operation will have a high priority for low density/high demand military assets
24. Forced entry will be required to intervene before winter descends on this country
25. Substantial humanitarian aid will be required immediately
26. Significant conventional forces will be required for non-permissive intervention

27. That specific and coordinated ROE have been developed which reflect MARO-specific requirements for US Government agencies, law enforcement, and contracted support
28. Mass starvation areas or region can be isolated by military means.

C. Mission Planning Parameters/Operational Factors/Perceptions/Considerations:

Preventive planning parameters: In this situation, there is time before winter, to change the GOY actions. Diplomatic efforts will work with information operations to continue the pressure on GOY to avoid practices that will lead to inevitable mass dying. Perceptions of GOY's culpability and determination to bring about this unnecessary disaster must be at the heart of UN/US information operations. The combatant command will use its theater security cooperation programs in the region to assist DOS diplomatic and information operations efforts to achieve perception dominance. It will also work closely with neighboring states to foster relationships which will lead to support for access, staging and long-term sustainment of the operation and follow-on coalition efforts to intervene and rebuild country Y. As part of the information operations perception build, and to lend credibility to the possibility of military action, the potential intervening nations may stage and exercise intervention forces in countries bordering country Y.

Intervention planning parameters: Should the GOY ignore the international community and continue actions deemed by the international community to be detrimental to the bulk of its population, then a mandate will be imposed (by the UN or a reasonably representative organization) delineating economic sanctions and even authorizing military intervention should economic efforts seem ineffective. Following that precedent, other regional security organizations such as NATO and the SCO will either support and assist the operation, or at least not hinder it. Once operations are underway, it is imperative that the intervening force information operations continue to dominate the international community's perceptions.

1. Operational/tactical planning factors for prevention or intervention operations
 - i. Access
 - a. Land-locked country in central Asia
 - b. Limited road/rail/air infrastructure
 - c. Surrounding nations have sufficient infrastructure to support intervention
 - ii. Terrain
 - a. Very mountainous with a few large valleys comprising the center of the country. Other population centers are in valleys scattered around the country.
 - iii. Weather
 - a. Temperature extremes correspond with seasons
 - b. Very harsh, long winters
 - c. Significant impact on operations particularly road and air movements
2. Prevention
 - i. Immediate Intervention Force (IIF) – prepared and staged to quickly intervene in country Y, if so ordered to prevent a mass atrocity

- a. This element might function as a small but potent symbol of intent to intervene and stand as a flexible deterrent option for policy makers at the operational or strategic level.
 - b. This element should be a combined arms force capable of penetrating a dense anti-air environment and placing infantry at tactically important areas of country Y. These elements should range from company to battalion-size depending on the logistic situation, and have dedicated helicopter fixed wing support.
- ii. Sustainment and Response Force (SRF) – designated to protect the Stabilization Assistance elements, ensure the overall security of the area and provide quick response combat reinforcements as needed.
 - a. This element functions as a larger reserve force if the smaller element is insufficient, or if the situation escalates toward a larger combat operation.
 - b. This element must be correspondingly larger than the IIF, i.e. if the IIF FDO is company-sized, this must be a battalion. It should have robust ground transport and some aviation assets in order to bolster a larger presence over a broader area and occupy key terrain.
 - iii. Stabilization Assistance Force (SAF) Sustainment – designated to provide combat service support to all force elements and humanitarian assistance to the population effected by the atrocity
 - a. This element acts as an FDO focused on the humanitarian aspects of the potential atrocity. It should be scaled and organized according to country Y’s mountainous terrain and the extreme weather for both summer and winter.
3. Intervention
- i. Immediate Intervention Forces (IIF) – designated to immediately intervene in mass atrocities. This element can move very quickly to the areas where they are most needed in order to restrain GOY forces or secure an area for internally displaced persons.
 - a. Bolstered by a robust supporting arms component, the IIF can quickly overwhelm any opponent.
 - b. It must have a medical element to care for those wounded before and during intervention.
 - ii. Sustainment and Response Forces (SRF)– designated to protect the humanitarian assistance elements, ensure the overall security of the area and provide quick response combat reinforcements as needed
 - a. Provides immediate combat support to the IIF.
 - b. Controls movement within the area of operations.
 - c. Ensures security of victim and refugee encampments.
 - d. Lead coordinator for coalition political and military agencies.
 - iii. Stabilization Assistance Forces (SAF) – task organized to support immediate and prioritized large-scale medical, sanitary, infrastructure requirements
 - a. Provides immediate treatment for wounded and injured.

- b. Provides sanitary and secure areas for intermediate medical facilities.
 - c. Functions as a coordinating element between the coalition's military and humanitarian NGOs operating in the area.
4. Mission Planning Perceptions
- i. How those fomenting the starvation see the intervention:
 - Q. What do they think of the intervening forces?
 - A. The GOY will resist intervention at every level and may attempt to bring other countries into the conflict. The people of country Y are warned from birth that the outside world is jealous of their accomplishments and will stop at nothing to destroy them.
 - Q. Will they fight the intervening force or submit?
 - A. The military will fight.
 - Q. If they will fight, will the entire population do so or only those directly doing the killing?
 - A. The people will initially support the GOY, but may turn against it once their perceptions have changed
 - ii. What is their IO theme?
 - a. Focus intervention IO campaign on favorably influencing the population of all the intervener's actions, while simultaneously discrediting the killers.¹
 - Q. How do they identify those they would kill?
 - A. Any one not in government positions or in the military
 - Q. Racial or visible ethnic (i.e. clothing/jewelry) distinctions?
 - A. No
 - Q. How those starving see the intervention?
 - A. Unknown
 - Q. Will they support the intervening forces?
 - A. Unknown
 - Q. Will they automatically accept humanitarian support?
 - A. Unknown
 - Q. What do they think of those attempting to kill them?
 - A. GOY is their unelected but sovereign government
 - Q. How will we prevent them from immediate revenge actions?
 - A. Establish 'Truth and Reconciliation' councils immediately
5. Cultural Considerations
- i. What can the intervening force do to facilitate reconciliation?
 - Employ bluff to bolster the possible intervention, even if the forces aren't immediately available. The intervening forces must use their knowledge of country Y's culture to threaten the GOY leadership with very severe consequences if they didn't either open the borders so food can get to the entire population or allow outside organizations to prove that food is no longer used as a weapon by the GOY.

¹ Counterinsurgency Manual, (2007), p.149

D. List Critical Variables from Joint Operating Environment

Critical Variable 1	GOY Leadership	People of country Y	Intervention Force	Observers
Geography and Physical Environment: complex terrain urban settings, weather, topography, hydrology, and geography.	Terrain is difficult to farm and most of the population is dependent on government distribution networks	Most people live in or near the capital. Those living outside the capital are scattered in river valleys around the country	Intervention forces must secure GLOCs, primary roads & all useable airfields. Mountainous terrain will channelize movement	The mountainous terrain tends to seal the borders and isolate Y's population from neighboring states

Critical Variable 2	GOY Leadership	People of country Y	Intervention Force	Observers
Nature and stability of the state: How is a state strong; political leadership, military, police, or something else? Gives the planner insight towards the true aims of a GOY's actions	GOY dominates all aspects of political/ethnic/economic life	Population is entirely subordinate and submissive to political & economic power	Intervention forces should focus on discrediting GOY leadership & breaking the unquestioned subordination	Y has little influence outside its borders. Without energy exports, Y would be most likely a hermit kingdom

Critical Variable 3	GOY Leadership	People of country Y	Intervention Force	Observers
Culture is a system of beliefs, values, etc common to that society. Understanding culture from the MARO perspective requires examining values, history, myths, & traditions that may combine to foster an MA	GOY leadership uses cultural superiority myths & xenophobia as means to extract unquestioning loyalty from the people	People of Y are considered by the leadership as expendable tools of the regime.	What should the people of Y be told after the GOY has been disposed? How should the country be integrated into the region, the international community?	Counties to the East are similar to Y in culture & may be able/willing to help assimilate Y into the international community

Critical Variable 4	GOY Leadership	People of country Y	Intervention Force	Observers
Sociological demographics: contribute significantly to possible mass atrocities. Perceived inequities, ethnic, religious, etc, can breed envy and anger, which when combined social instability can lead towards an MA inducing environment.	Leadership is using the constant threat of invasion to keep people from thinking about domestic hardships	Population has no say in internal or foreign affairs of Y. Their only purpose is to serve the leadership	Developing a reasonably democratic population responsible for its own affairs & integrating them into the international community will be a very long process	Regional partners will be the key to the long-term success of the reconciliation and justice process.

Critical Variable 5	GOY Leadership	People of country Y	Intervention Force	Observers
Regional and global relationships: political, economic, military, or cultural connections. May determine its internal/external support, motivation, and alliances, thereby increasing capability and broaden the scale of operations	Leadership is an active member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. NATO PfP membership was discontinued as a result of western nations taking action against GOY repression of its people	The people of Y are not protected by regional interests. Most regional leaders consider Y to be an odd but tolerable neighbor.	The SCO could deflect the economic sanctions against Y & could stop intervention efforts by any coalition. NATO nations are on record as supporting action against GOY, but will not support action if SCO is actively against it.	SCO & non-member states could block UN action or could do it themselves. SCO is the most important regional security organization in this operation.

Critical Variable 6	GOY Leadership	People of country Y	Intervention Force	Observers
Military capabilities: ranging from conventional, developed irregular warfare and non state actors organizing militias, paramilitary, terrorists with niche technologies	GOY leadership has direct and complete control of all the Y armed forces. Y has a very large ground force & a sophisticated integrated air defense network. The military controls food distribution in Y & maintains infrastructure	People of Y have no protection against the military which also acts as a repressive internal police force.	Military intervention will require immediate air supremacy & neutralization of Y ground mobility. Intervention forces must be configured to execute these missions first then support HA operations immediately	Military capabilities of outsiders must be used to support interveners against GOY not only for immediate combat support reasons, but for IO success

Critical Variable 7	GOY Leadership	People of country Y	Intervention Force	Observers
Technology: reflects sophistication within the operational environment which may erode the intervener's technological advantage.	Will use technology to conceal inaction or deny access to the people & block reporting	Have virtually no technological recourse against GOY repression	Must use technology to expose GOY's efforts at hiding its actions & illustrate GOY's repression of its people	Regional capabilities could range from military technology (e.g. anti-air defenses) to medical & legal capabilities

Critical Variable 8	GOY Leadership	People of country Y	Intervention Force	Observers
Information dissemination: Various actors seek to use perception management to control and manipulate how the public sees things	Typically determined to maintain IO dominance by defeating early detection methods, keeping opsec as thousands die & afterward for denial requirements	People of Y have no recourse against GOY	Vital to preventative actions, & keeping SA on developing MA. Also important to keep the intervening coalition from unraveling	Outside elements must be used to emphasize intervener's IO message over that of the GOYs

Critical Variable 9	GOY Leadership	People of country Y	Intervention Force	Observers
External organizations: affecting the conflict NGOs, humanitarian organizations, corporations, transnational organizations in the target country	GOY has allowed only NGO who echo the GOY position into the country. UN mission has been limited to a very small aspect of the country & nothing damaging to the GOY is ever reported	No reliable information on the peoples' attitude toward NGOs exists.	These organizations can significantly assist in understanding facts on the ground, before the intervention, what's going on during the MA and where evidence is hidden	As much as possible, the plan must use these elements to amply the IO reasons for intervention & define transformation requirements

Critical Variable 10	GOY Leadership	People of country Y	Intervention Force	Observers
National Will encompasses values, morals, and effort of the population, the leadership and the military.	GOY leadership is the state. There is no replacement for the central authority & it tolerates no internal competition.	The GOY leadership has completely smothered the peoples' aspirations for a better life by focusing attention on foreign threats as the primary distraction	GOY will target US national will by boasting of how many casualties it will inflict in the course of an intervention & how the energy price will be affected by the country's withdrawal from the market	People of Y are not ethnically related to other regional people. Ethnic relations will not drive the regional response

Critical Variable 11	GOY Leadership	People of country Y	Intervention Force	Observers
Time is a critical factor for setting tactical, operational, and strategic advantages. Perps will use the time between the initiation of an MA to intervention to shape the environment	GOY leadership will attempt to delay intervention by any means possible	People of Y have few resources & limited opportunity to stop the oncoming disaster	Critical to recognizing the potential MA, organizing a coalition, setting FDOs and trip wires for intervention	Will/can regional forces intervene before any other? Or would they act to slow down intervention?

Critical Variable 12	GOY Leadership	People of country Y	Intervention Force	Observers
<p>Economics: Control of and access to natural or strategic resources can cause mass atrocity. Economic deprivation is also a major cause of mass atrocity. Perps may have economic superiority over vics for many reasons, including access to natural resources or power.</p>	<p>GOY will use every economic lever they can to break the coalition arrayed against them</p>	<p>People of Y have never seen the benefits of higher oil prices & have no say in how either the resource is recovered or how the money is spent</p>	<p>Economic FDOs could play a very important role in preventing or initiating an MA. Economic relationships could significantly shape the transition and fostering sustainability stages following the intervention</p>	<p>Other energy suppliers could make up the difference to the world market, thus mitigating GOYs action. Such market resiliency is possible but maybe fragile depending on how the coalition is build & maintained.</p>

E. Drivers of Conflict Analysis

Drivers of Conflict Analysis	GOY Ethnicity	Subordinate Ethnicity	Intervention Force	Observers
Context – Context may create pre-conditions for conflict by reinforcing fault lines between communities	Complete control of the country's governmental structure suppresses dissent	Continue to struggle under a system that oppresses their will to survive & ultimately improve their lives	International Community feels compelled to stop or prevent mass atrocity	International & regional support will depend on perception of the intervention as just or is another 'neo-colonialist' act
Core grievances and sources of social/institutional resilience – perceptions of a group's specific need and faith government to consider those needs.	Unwilling to surrender any increment of power to people & retains complete control	Peoples' access to information is very limited & GOY controls all means of communications, thus people have no forma for open expression	Helps clarify the type of relationship between GOY & people while outlining potential friction points for a transitional government post-intervention	Ethnic friction may extend beyond X's borders & complicate those govt's willingness to assist intervention or prevention efforts
Drivers of conflict and mitigating factors – 'The dynamic situation resulting from Key Actors' mobilization of social groups around core grievances or around governmental restraints	GOY leadership incessantly presses the people w/images of foreign threats & keeps social tension high. Limited foreign presence w/in X has little or no influence on people	Unrelenting GOY scrutiny & control of media prevent people's key actor(s) from rising. There are no elements of resistance capable or coalescing into a single powerful opposition.	Intervention forces must make clear to all audiences what & how GOY is brutally oppressing the people & suppressing their vocal dissent. This is a vital element of the mission: answers the why question.	Intervention IO must be credible to international community & supporting regional powers. It must always be evident that the GOY is perpetrating a crime against its people
Windows of vulnerability and windows of opportunity – '...moments when events threaten to rapidly and fundamentally change the balance of political or economic power.'	GOY will press intensely to maintain hold on power over people & economic control before winter when they are most vulnerable to invasion	Prior to winter people are most mobile & therefore most likely to form resistance organizations. In winter the chances diminish.	If the intervention forces are not prepared to stage quickly, it will be impossible to intervene before winter. Intervention diplomatic efforts must ratchet up pressure on GOY immediately.	International community must support preventative diplomacy during spring & summer. Then it must support intervention forces deployment to the region.

F. Critical Capabilities & Vulnerabilities

	GOY	People of Y	Interveners	Others
Critical Capability — Considered a crucial enabler for a center of gravity to function as such and is essential to the accomplishment of the specified or assumed objective	Control of every aspect of Y's peoples' lives: food, electricity, movement, social recognition & livelihood	Ability to organize resistance to government	Use of deadly force, control of movement, military mobility and immediate reinforcements & medical support	Capacity to support intervention immediately (mil/humanitarian logistics) & over long term by supporting new GOY
Critical Requirement — An essential condition, resource, and means for a critical capability to be fully operational	Unimpeded freedom of movement & unquestioned control over resources & social direction	Develop distrust in GOY & hope in outside intervention	Authorization for military intervention, international support & minimal casualties	Willingness to support intervention & rebuilding of Y
Critical Vulnerability — An aspect of a critical requirement which is deficient or vulnerable to direct or indirect attack that will create decisive or significant effects	Governmental of Y command & control of economy, military & people	Information on GOY's culpability & responsibility for their misery	Speed of response, lack of mandate/international will, and casualty aversion	Loss of energy supplies, military attack from Y & large emigrant flow from Y

G. Essential tasks necessary to accomplish the mission prioritized as Main, Supporting and Setting Conditions

Stage I, Intervention

Main Operational Tasks

1. Intervene directly and force GOY to accept humanitarian aid
2. Protect vulnerable elements of population (refugees, IDP, women, children) (UJTL ST 6.2.6)
3. Protect key political and societal leaders resisting GOY policies (related to UJTL ST 6.2.6)
4. Locate and safeguard key witnesses, documents and other evidence related to key ongoing or potential U.S. investigations and prosecutions (UJTL ST 6.2.6)
5. Identify and detain GOY leadership (related to UJTL ST 4.4.3)
6. Secure military depots, equipment, ammunition dumps and means of communication (UJTL ST 6.2)
7. Immediately secure evidence of governmental malfeasance of food distribution for forensic and related exploitation
8. Document and preserve evidence of mass atrocities and maintain data on sites (UJTL ST 6.2)
9. Ensure humanitarian aid and security force access to endangered populations and refugee camps (UJTL ST 8.2.8.3)
10. Establish IDP camps if necessary and provide basic Stabilization Assistance

Supporting Operational Tasks

1. Support the combat forces
2. Disarm GOY military (Uniform Joint Task List ST 8.2.8.3)
3. Enforce ceasefires
4. Dismantle roadblocks and establish checkpoints (UJTL ST 1.6.1)
5. Monitor vulnerable groups and act preemptively to deter human rights abuses; implement effective warning mechanisms (UJTL ST 8.4)
6. Identify and neutralize potential spoilers (UJTL ST 8.2.8.3)
7. Engage indigenous forces capable of promoting immediate stability (UJTL ST 8.2.9)
8. Secure records, storage, equipment and funds related to criminal justice and security institutions (UJTL ST 6.2.6)
9. Ensure coordination with law enforcement components to deter violence
10. Reinforce IIF in combat operations as required
11. Protect vulnerable elements of population (refugees, IDP, women, children) (UJTL ST 6.2.6)
12. Locate and safeguard key witnesses, documents and other evidence related to ongoing or potential U.S. investigations and prosecutions (UJTL ST 6.2.6)
13. Identify and detain GOY leaders responsible for these offences (UJTL ST 4.4.3)
14. Assist in investigation, arrest, and transfer of suspected war criminals to international courts (UJTL ST 4.4.3)
15. Identify the critical information needed, where to find it, what are major gaps, and how to share, present and disseminate the information. If possible conduct this assessment in advance and identify the gaps in data, information and knowledge (UJTL ST 8.2.3)

16. Maintain freedom of movement and ensure open borders for potential refugees (UJTL ST 8.2.1)
17. Ensure humanitarian aid and security force access to endangered populations and refugee camps (UJTL ST 8.2.8.3)
18. Identify and coordinate emergency requirements (UJTL ST 8.2.4)
19. Establish and enforce weapons control regimes, including collection and destruction (UJTL SN 9.3)
20. Ensure freedom of movement (UJTL ST 1.6.1)
21. Establish and disseminate rules relevant to movement (UJTL ST 1.6.1)
22. Control crowds, prevent looting and manage civil disturbances (UJTL ST 4.4.3)
23. Protect and secure critical infrastructure, natural resources, civil registries, property ownership documents (UJTL ST 6.2)
24. Protect places of religious worship and cultural sites (UJTL ST 6.2)
25. Protect private property and factories (UJTL ST 6.2)
26. Establish border security, including customs regime to prevent arms smuggling, interdict contraband (i.e., drugs and natural resources), prevent trafficking of persons, regulate immigration and emigration, and establish control over major points of entry (UJTL ST 8.2.1)
27. Perform civilian police functions including investigating crimes and making arrests (UJTL ST 4.4.3)
28. Supervise incarceration processes and transfer to prison facilities (UJTL ST 4.4.3)
29. Secure records, storage, equipment and funds related to criminal justice and security institutions (UJTL ST 6.2)
30. Ensure adequate protection and monitoring (UJTL ST 8.4)

Setting Conditions for the Next Stage

1. Protect government-sponsored civilian stabilization and reconstruction personnel (UJTL ST 6.2.6)
2. Protect contractor and NGO stabilization personnel and resources (UJTL ST 8.2.11)
3. Conduct emergency de-mining and UXO removal (UJTL ST 8.2.13)
4. Mark mine fields (UJTL ST 8.2.13)
5. Enact interim legal codes and procedures permitted by international law.
6. Identify, secure and preserve evidence of war crimes, crimes against humanity, corruption, and transnational crimes, including terrorism, organized crime, financial crimes, trafficking in humans and narcotics (UJTL ST 6.2)
7. Inventory courts, law schools, legal libraries, and bar associations (UJTL ST 8.2.3)
8. Inventory police stations, police mobility capabilities, police communications systems, data management systems and police headquarters (UJTL ST 8.2.3)
9. Collect information that can provide operational or programmatic information (e.g., logistical access routes; "who's doing what where"; program/financial needs of organizations; who are other donors) (UJTL ST 8.2.11)
10. Collect information for background knowledge (e.g., history; geography; population demographics and composition; baseline health indicators; political and economic structure and status; infrastructure; and culture of the country) (UJTL ST 2.4.1.1)
11. Assess and secure access to valuable natural resources (UJTL ST 6.2)

12. Continue to assess for most serious environmental hazards (e.g., lead, mercury, dioxin) (UJTL ST 8.4)
13. Safeguard/mitigate most dangerous health hazards (UJTL ST 8.4)
14. Provide sufficient external medical support while integrating indigenous expertise (UJTL ST 8.2.4)
15. Ensure adequate health, food provisions, and security for entire population (UJTL ST.8.2.4)
16. Restore essential local public services (UJTL ST 8.2.4)
17. Coordinate efforts, as feasible, with UN, regional organization and NGOs (UJTL ST 8.2)

Stage II, Transformation

Main Tasks

1. Establish and control buffers (UJTL ST 8.2.8.3)
2. Continue provision of protection and assistance to IDPs in camps, homestays and communities (UJTL ST 8.4)

Supporting Tasks

1. Continue provision of protection and assistance to IDPs in camps, homestays and communities (UJTL ST 8.4)
2. Establish and maintain order in refugee camps (UJTL ST 8.4)

Setting Conditions

1. Continue to assess for most serious environmental hazards (e.g., lead, mercury, dioxin) (UJTL ST 8.4)
2. Support and enforce political, military, and economic arrangements (UJTL ST 8.2.6)
3. Continue to analyze information in context; relate to other thematic information; evaluate issues and responses; make projections about the future; recommend policies and actions
4. Provide sufficient external medical support while integrating indigenous expertise (UJTL ST 8.2.4)

Stage III, Fostering Sustainability:

Main Tasks

1. Rebuild indigenous capacity to protect infrastructure & maintain positive relations with indigenous population (UJTL ST 8.2.2)
2. Institutionalize civic education into the formal school system
3. Provide logistical support for elections (ballot boxes, voting stations, etc.) if required (UJTL ST 8.4)
4. Transfer monitor requirements to indigenous security institutions (UJTL ST 4.4.3.1)
5. Establish military-to-military programs with the host country's forces (UJTL ST 8.2.1)
6. Support conventional military assistance programs (UJTL ST 8.2.1)

Supporting Tasks

1. Transfer responsibilities to HN, IGOs & NGOs

2. Support transition to HN redevelopment
3. Redeploy forces

H. Identify the end states

Mass starvation is avoided or minimized, leaders of GOY are deposed or neutralized and subject to criminal proceedings, injured getting medical care, societal reconciliation underway, regional forces deployed & government has capability/capacity to sustainable progress.

	GOY	People of Y	Intervener	Others
End state	Regime is broken or severely diminished – people are no longer subjugated & evidence of mass starvation is published & former GOY leadership are under legal restraint	Mass starvation is avoided or stopped, leaders of GOY in criminal proceedings, food is distributed, injured receiving medical care, societal reconciliation underway, intervening governments committed to sustainable process	Mass starvation is avoided or minimized, GOY leaders are in criminal proceedings, food is distributed injured getting medical care, societal reconciliation underway, regional relationships are in place and prospering & GOY has capability/capacity to sustainable progress.	Political & economic disruptions are minor, Y’s rebuilding is underway & non-threatening

J. State the mission

The Intervening Coalition will conduct operations in and around country Y to prevent and stop mass starvation and genocide, isolate the government of Y’s leadership, protect the people of Y, provide security for the flow of humanitarian aid and provide a secure environment facilitating the distribution of food and humanitarian aid.

K. Commander’s Intent

The intervening coalition will prevent with diplomatic and economic means or interdict via military means the GOY’s stated desire to starve a majority of its population this winter and will catalyze the unraveling of the GOY’s authoritarian control of the people. This will be accomplished with the dedicated assistance of the states bordering Y and regional security organizations. Military force will be used to break the grip on the people if it is required to protect the humanitarian aid needed to end mass starvation.

L. Commander's Critical Information Requirements: Strategic, Political, Economic, Military, Geographic/Meteorological, and Infrastructure Factors

Strategic Factors	GOY	People	Intervener	Others
Are vital strategic US interests at risk?	No	No	What is the intended political objective of intervention?	Can they provide economic/political/military support? For how long/where?
What IGOs/NGOs are in-country? And doing what?	Does UN/NGO presence effect GOY behavior?	Are people receiving aid from IGOs/NGOs? Are they capable of helping IGO forces?	Authorized/not authorized to help UN/NGOs? What assistance can interveners provide?	If UN is providing security, do they have adequate ROE to prevent escalation. or assist intervention?
Strategic Risks of Action	Will GOY actions be ignored, thus rewarded?	Will suffering go unnoticed, and for how long?	Will US international reputation suffer from inaction?	Do other countries want this problem resolved? Will they fight as part of a coalition?
When to prevent or intervene	What early-warning indicators informed the IC of GOY intent, and actions?	How do people know what's coming? What are they doing to prepare?	How will compellence/prevention efforts be implemented?	What will the IC do to help or hinder intervention?

Political Factors	GOY	People	Intervener	Others
Who are the major political players?	Name/position/background/relationship to victims, and from where do they draw political strength?	Name/position/background/relationship to GOY & from where do they draw political strength?	Name/position/historical relationship to target-state	Name/position/background
What do they perceive as the problem	How do they communicate? What are they saying? Why have they chosen a strategy of mass violence to resolve the problem?	How do they communicate? What are they saying? What have they done politically to resolve the problem with perps?	How deep is the domestic political will to sustain intervention & hand over? Does the IC support intervener's actions?	How is the country and its problem regionally/internationally regarded?
When should we talk to them?	Before winter & the onset of mass starvation	Before winter & they starve	As we plan, allot, coordinate, stage & exercise military intervention forces with humanitarian supplies	During compellance, & before intervention
Where are they & how can we talk to them?	Capital of Y, UN mission	Any broadcast means available	Who should talk to whom? How to do it?	Act as intermediary? Acting in good faith or bad?
Why should/shouldn't we prevent or intervene?	GOY will continue to brutally repress its people w/o IC interference	800,000 people could starve	Political risks of inaction outweigh physical/political risks of intervention & long term involvement	Prevent/stop large cross border refugee flows. Address significant regional problem. Or impede in order to do it themselves.

Economic Factors	GOY	People	Intervener	Others
Does the US	No	None	How strategically	Can the region

have strategic economic relationships w/country/perps?			important is this economic relationship versus preventing mass atrocity?	provide an economic substitute? Is preventing mass atrocity as important to them?
Are sanctions viable?	Have the economic assets of victims been identified, and are they vulnerable to sanctions? Is the GOY economically vulnerable?	Will the people suffer more than the GOY under sanctions?	How credible will sanctions be depends on export/import importance to economy, including the any major export's commodity value	Will border states spt sanctions or allow 'porous borders'? Will others support the sanctions?
How could it re-join the international community?	Reconciliation & reintegration problems	Reconciliation & reintegration problems	How credible is the commitment to fostering sustainability?	What is in their collective or individual interest for country Y?

Military Factors	GOY	People	Intervener	Others
Pol/Mil C2	Who are the leaders? How do they communicate? Where are they?	Who are the resistance leaders? How do they communicate? Where are they?	How much political will exists to sustain intervention & hand over?	What is Y's status within the SCO? Other regional security organizations?
Military Capability	What can they do? Where is it? Can we get at it?	Can they defend themselves? How can we help them?	Can other coalition members project the required forces in time?	Can they fill in the time/distance gap for intervening forces? How can they help people against GOY?
Post Conflict Security environment	How to reconcile and reintegrate into the international community?	How to reconcile & rebuild population?	How to secure environment for fostering sustainability	Do they have long-term will & capability to assist sustainment?

Geographic & Meteorological Factors	GOY	People	Intervener	Others
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Prevention	Helps GOY ability to mask actions	Hinders ability to show situation	Hinders ability to see actions	Hinders ability to see actions
Intervention	How does GOY use environment to hide actions	Can Victim use terrain to aid intervention?	How much force to where by when?	Capability to operate in JOA?

Infrastructure Factors	GOY	People	Intervener	Others
Prevention	GOY controls all movement & food distribution	Have very limited mobility	Effects specific intervention plans (category & amount of engineering support)	Have effective border control & spt sanctions
Intervention	GOY may destroy vital infrastructure during intervention	People must either walk to aid or have aid brought to them	Can spt immediate direct intervention or slow build up of force in some areas	Capability to operate in JOA?

M. Prioritized Constraints/Restraints

Constraints (What must be done)

1. Coordinate with economic and diplomatic efforts at prevention and intervention
2. Maintain coalition solidarity with neighboring states
3. Stop or minimize mass starvation in country Y
4. Prevent Y from attacking nations supporting coalition operations
5. Secure specific APODs and GLOCs within Y on order
6. Keep IC apprised of coalition actions in contrast to those of GOY
7. Promulgate how the GOY is intentionally starving its people
8. Achieve air superiority over likely sites for refugee camps
9. Defend citizens of Y traveling to and inside refugee camps

Restraints (What must NOT be done)

1. Fracture existing strategic alliances
2. Instigate regional instability
3. Jeopardize coalition cohesiveness
4. Strengthen GOY information operations

N. Commander's Planning Guidance

1. Intelligence preparation of the theater of operations/JOA must include a cultural analysis with specific focus on the relationship between the GOY and its people. We must know if:
 - i. The GOY is sustaining/encouraging the mass starvation passively or actively
 - ii. The GOY has anything to gain from the results/outcome of a mass starvation.
 - iii. The degree and nature of GOY control of its armed forces and police.
2. Address how we can tailor our information operations to assist in:
 - i. Changing the GOY's will to starve its people
 - ii. Encouraging resistance to the GOY in the country to support our operation
3. Answer the question, will our intervention serve the GOY by unite the people to fight against us; will they see us as invaders or liberators?
4. Address how our intervention might strengthen or weaken regional organizations.
5. Address how neighboring countries/groups will either benefit from the mass atrocity or benefit from our intervention and how either would affect regional stability.
6. Answer the question, what is the short, mid, and long term cost of not intervening?
7. The Government of Y has an action advantage over the coalition until it can effectively intervene, therefore all COAs must address how quickly we can effectively establish a sustainable, credible, armed coalition response in the JOA. Our response force must be strategically and operationally agile and have a significant tactical mobility and protection advantage over the GOY military. The response force must also have an information advantage over the perpetrators.
8. Consider the following concepts for COA development:
 - i. A compellence COA that maximizes the use of precision lethal and non-lethal fires, with SOF DA/SR/terminal guidance teams, to destroy selected perpetrator assets and disrupts command and control. Support this with shaping information operations. This COA must be supported by analysis that shows the GOY is susceptible to this form of coercion.
 - ii. A COA that establishes safe havens throughout the country.
 - iii. A COA that saturates threatened areas with small operating bases that assure local security. This COA must include a strong reserve/reaction force.
 - iv. Assume forcible entry: thus all the preceding ground intervention COAs will consider the use of lethal and non-lethal fires as a precursor to the entry of land forces.
 - v. All COAs will focus on feeding and protecting the people and establishing sufficient security to enable mission handover to regional/international or UN forces for long term stability operations.
 - vi. All COAs will assume USG diplomatic efforts will develop a stabilization force and engage regional/international efforts to sustain stability and a reconciliation process.

II. Courses of Action (COAs) Development

A. GOY Courses of Action

1. Prevention Phase: GOY will use its total control of the economy, military & people to prepare its people to fight against an invasion by the intervening coalition forces. It will likely increase the ruthlessness of its already deeply inhuman treatment of the people. It will work diligently to convince the people that coalition forces only want Y's oil and Gas and will defile the land and destroy the country's unique culture in order to get it. To the international community, GOY will threaten to cut off energy exports and destabilize the region with military attacks on neighboring states and disruptively large refugee flows. Using international venues, Y will decry the intervention as a conspiratorial violation of its sovereignty and attempt to undermine the mandate against them as unjust and economically driven.

2. Intervention Phase: GOY will resist military intervention conventionally. It will focus first on airspace denial then territorial defense. If it is defeated militarily, it will destroy economic infrastructure (oil wells and pipelines) then target civil infrastructure (hydro-electric generation, power lines, water supplies, telephone lines, roads and bridges) to isolate population centers and delay coalition forces. Once its conventional forces have been destroyed, the remaining elements will assume unconventional roles and continue to attack and resist coalition forces, while spreading the conflict into Border States.

B. Coalition Courses of Action Narratives

1. Prevention
 - i. Course of Action 1: Compel GOY to feed its people and avoid mass starvation. Compel GOY to allow open and unfettered food distribution and electrical supply throughout the country. This is the primary preventative COA. Its duration will be defined by moment when the international community authorizes action against GOY and the onset of winter and reports of large numbers of the people are starving. Flexible deterrent options linking diplomatic efforts, economic sanctions and overt military actions will be coordinated with regional security organizations, with the intent to increase tension on the GOY as winter nears and the global demands to change its policy intensify. The military component of that build up will be the deployment and staging of coalition military power to levels obviously capable of intervening. Information operations will focus on illustrating to the international community the stark contrast between the coalition's reasonable demands and the pathological determination of GOY to starve its people. Should the GOY not respond positively to this course of action, the coalition will be prepared to launch an intervention operation against the GOY to stop or mitigate mass starvation of the people of Y.

COMPELLENCE	GOY	People	Interveners	Others
Spt Diplomatic/political	Will oppose & attempt to undermine	Unknown	FDOs are arrayed increase pressure on GOY	Broadens basis for international mandate & non-regional spt to coalition obj.
Strengthen regional alliances	Will oppose & attempt to fracture	N/A	Spts gradual coalition coalescence & preps for military intervention	Lays foundation for new relationships or strengthens those existing
Information Operations	Absolute rejection of intervention & calls on people to prepare for worst	Focus on food & shelter available in camps.	Must persuade GOY to stop and IC to support GOY's removal	Solidify coalition strengthen mandate, broaden international support, prep for intervention
Effect on GOY control of people (food distribution)	May accelerate GOY's repressive measures	May be willing to fight for food	Monitor any changes in numbers as closely as possible	Neighbor states oppose GOY & support coalition
Forcible entry & Lethal Force requirements	Will threaten lethal force against coalition & neighbors	N/A	Give impression of determination to use lethal force to intervene	Write ROE within coalition parameters
Logistics	Will hoard food & supplies to outlast sanctions	N/A	Open deployment & staging adds credit to coalition willingness to intervene	Allows coalition coordination, planning, exercises & operations
Duration	Will strike if able	The famine will continue through the winter	Starts w/ international community mandate & ends on certain date	International community, RSOs, etc. have say in duration
Intelligence	GOY intell will try to gauge coalition credibility	Gauge direction of people's support for or against GOY	Focus efforts on LOCs, camp sites & resistance to GOY leadership	Develop spt networks for people of Y & est. alternate camp sites, HA requirements.

*flexible deterrent options are defined by the DoD as: a planning construct used in early decision making by developing a wide range of interrelated responses are carefully tailored to produce a desired effect.

2. Intervention

i. Course of Action 1: Saturation – Overthrow GOY and Establish Provisional

Government: This COA will focus on the capital region and its densely inhabited valley in the northern central part of the country. Using military force to attacking the leadership of the GOY and its enabling communications, social and civil infrastructure. This COA will demand an overwhelming military strike to destroy Y's leadership, its air force and immobilize its large and omnipresent military. The primary targets of this military action will be the leadership of GOY, its command and control structures and its fuel reserves. The primary objective of this course of action will be the government leadership in the capital region. The peripheral areas will have secondary planning priorities. Once the military has been neutralized, coalition forces will assume a nation-wide humanitarian support role to immediately distribute food throughout the nation and provide security. While military forces will support the civilian agencies in rebuilding Y, they will be prepared to conduct counterinsurgency operations should elements of the previous regime slip into guerilla operations.

SATURATION/ REPLACE GOY	GOY	People	Interveners	Others
Spt Diplomatic/political effort	Will oppose & attempt to undermine	Unknown	Provisional replacement GOY is ready to assume office	Key to coalition credulity & to regional support
Strengthen regional alliances	Will oppose & attempt to fracture coalition	Emphasize ethnic connection across borders	Coalition action strengthens regional alliances diplomatic, economic & military means	Possibly – may have substantial risk if too bloody or long
Information Operations	Absolute rejection of intervention & calls on people to prepare for worst & fight coalition	Find food & shelter while showing how cruel life is under GOY	Must persuade GOY to stop and IC to support GOY's removal	Maintain coalition & highlight the cruelty of GOY against humanity of intervention
Effect on GOY control of people (food distribution)	May accelerate GOY's repressive measures	GOY will convince people to fight intervention	Prepare to conduct large scale humanitarian ops first near capitol, then outside regions	Neighbor states support feeding people of Y on large scale
Forcible entry & Lethal Force requirements	Will use lethal force against coalition & neighbors	Expect to suffer significantly	Significant conventional military capability required to intervene	Support forcible intervention w/ troops, material, transport & access
Logistics	Will hoard food & supplies to outlast sanctions prior to intervention	Limited to what's on hand & nearby	Immediate stockpile of military support, then transition to large-scale humanitarian ops	Allows coalition coordination, planning & operations. Supports criminal prosecution of former GOY officials.
Duration	Will attempt outlast coalition & demand mandate be rescinded	Shorter is better	Starts w/ international community mandate & ends on order from coalition leadership	International community, RSOs, etc. have say in duration
Intelligence	GOY intel will gauge coalition credibility & weaknesses	Gauge depth of coalition's willingness to fight for them	Focus on GOY leadership personalities, locations & networks	Develop spt networks for new GOY

ii. Course of Action 2: Partial Occupation of Y – Establish Selected Safe Havens within Y: This COA will require direct military action by the coalition to overwhelm GOY air defenses and ground forces around selected population centers near the periphery. The primary consideration in this course of action is to provide secure air and ground corridors for either the movement of supplies to selected population centers of Y, where a provisional government will start to rebuild the country. The focus of this COA will to destroy GOYs air force and neutralize or fix its ground forces in the capitol region. Once the outlying areas are secure and those population centers are getting adequate food and electricity, coalition IO campaign, the primary effort of this COA, will broadcast that success to the international community and the portions of Y still under GOY control. It will closely synchronize with diplomatic and economic efforts to force the GOY leadership to leave the country without significant bloodshed and destruction. This COA requires substantially less ‘up-front’ military capability from the coalition initially, but it must be expandable to a larger force capable of attacking the capital region, should the other coalition elements fail to bring about the regime’s downfall.

PARTIAL OCCUPATION	GOY	People	Interveners	Others
Spt Diplomatic/political	Will fight & undermine coalition objectives	Open support to anti-GOY personalities in safe areas	Provisional GOY replacement controls safe areas	Key to coalition credulity & to regional support
Strengthen regional alliances	Will attack those supporting coalition to split them from it	N/A	Coalition action strengthens regional alliances diplomatic, economic & military means	Possibly – may have substantial risk if too long or unsuccessful
Information Operations	Absolute rejection of intervention & calls on people to reject the invader	Help those in safe areas & show how cruel life is under GOY	Must persuade GOY to leave & IC to support GOY's departure or surrender	Maintain coalition & highlight the cruelty of GOY against humanity of intervention
Effect on GOY control of people (food distribution)	Will increase oppressive actions & tighten controls	People in outlying areas will suffer during intervention	Prepare to conduct large scale humanitarian ops first in safe areas, then near capitol	Neighbor states support feeding people of Y on moderate scale
Forcible entry & Lethal Force requirements	Will fight & attack coalition & neighbors	Humanitarian support to those in safe areas	Moderate conventional military capability required to intervene	Support forcible intervention w/ troops, material, transport & access
Logistics	Simplifies GOY supplies to largest population ctrs	People in safe areas will need large scale humanitarian help	Smaller stockpile of military supplies, then transition to medium-scale humanitarian ops	Allow coalition coordination, planning & operations. Support new GOY officials
Duration	Longer will help regime resist	Bulk of pop will suffer greatly the longer the duration	On order until end of winter or GOY demise	International community, RSOs, etc. have say in duration
Intelligence	GOY intell will try to gauge coalition strength over long term	Will know how long GOY can hold out	Focus on GOY leadership personalities, locations & networks	Develop spt networks for new GOY w/in unoccupied areas

iii. Course of Action 3: Attraction – Establish Safe Havens In Neighboring Countries.

Establish Safe Havens in neighboring states where people of Y could emigrate and find guaranteed food and shelter. Coordinate with countries willing to open borders to support expatriate Y citizens. This COA's primary objective is defense of neighboring states from aggressive Y action and the establishment of secure areas for erecting camps and staging supplies in safe havens specifically for people of Y who refuse to starve. The coalition IO campaign will emphasize the purpose and capabilities of these camps throughout their construction and once these camps are complete and ready, the coalition will broadcast the stark contrast between the large stockpiles of supplies at these camps with the harsh desolation that the people of Y are enduring at the direction of their government. The IO campaign objective will be to combine with diplomatic and economic efforts to oust the GOY leadership without bloodshed. This COA will require significant defensive military capability by the coalition to deter GOY air or ground attacks near selected population centers along the country's borders. However, this COA must be expandable to a larger military force.

EXTERNAL SAFE HAVENS	GOY	People	Interveners	Others
Spt Diplomatic/political	Will oppose & attempt to undermine	Know that coalition will help them if they can leave	Coalition supports action w/ increasing pressure on GOY	Broadens basis for international mandate & non-regional spt to coalition obj.
Strengthen regional alliances	Will oppose & may attack neighbors willing to help coalition	People may support anti-GOY personalities in neighboring states	Coalition action builds regional alliances diplomatic, economic & military means	Possibly – may have substantial risk if too long or unsuccessful
Information Operations	Absolute rejection of interference & calls on people to stay put	Focus on food & shelter available in camps & how people can get to it	Must persuade GOY to leave & IC to support GOY's departure or surrender	Maintain coalition & highlight the cruelty of GOY against humanity
Effect on GOY control of people (food distribution)	May accelerate GOY's repressive measures	Will have limited to zero impact	Prepare to conduct small scale humanitarian ops in safe areas	Neighbor states support feeding people of Y on small scale
Forcible entry & Lethal Force requirements	May take action against specific nations opposing GOY	May require confrontation with Y military & militia	Moderate conventional military capability required to defend external safe havens	Coordinate development of defensive ROE within coalition
Logistics	Will block border crossings & control goods flow	Distance, terrain & weather will hamper movement	Smaller stockpile of humanitarian supplies & moderate military defensive supplies	Allow coalition coordination, planning & operations.
Duration	Longer will not hurt GOY, if people stay in Y	Weather may not allow migration	On order until end of winter or GOY demise	International community, RSOs, etc. have say in duration
Intelligence	GOY intell will try to gauge coalition capability to last	Must know how to get to camps safely	Focus efforts on LOCs, camp sites & resistance leadership	Develop spt networks for Y & est. alternate camp sites, HA requirements.

C. Course of Action Wargaming

1. Prevention: GOY will use its total control of the economy, military & people to prepare its people to fight against an invasion by the intervening coalition forces. It will likely increase the ruthlessness of its already deeply inhuman treatment of the people. It will work diligently to convince the people that coalition forces only want Y's oil and Gas and will defile the land and destroy the country's unique culture in order to get it. To the international community, GOY will threaten to cut off energy exports and destabilize the region with military attacks on neighboring states and disruptively large refugee flows. Using international venues, Y will decry the intervention as a conspiratorial violation of its sovereignty and attempt to undermine the mandate against them as unjust and economically driven.

COA 1 Compellence – Most Likely						
Intervener's Action	GOY Reaction	People Reaction	Regional Reaction	Counter Action	Function	CCIR
Issuance of Mandate & conduct FDOs & deploy forces	International protests, increased rationing & threaten neighboring states	Endure continuing hardships	Increase readiness & spt coalition actions	Amplify that escalation is GOY's decision	Diplomatic IO	What will the IC do to help or hinder intervention?

COA 1 Compellence – Most Dangerous						
Intervener's Action	GOY Reaction	People Reaction	Regional Reaction	Counter Action	Function	CCIR
Issuance of Mandate & conduct FDOs & deploy forces	International protests, increased rationing & attacks neighboring states	Endure extreme hardships	Split coalition & withdraw support	Defend neighboring states	Diplomatic military spt	Can they support economic, political & military action? For how long?

2. Intervention: GOY will resist military intervention conventionally. It will focus first on airspace denial then territorial defense. If it is defeated militarily, it will destroy economic infrastructure (oil wells and pipelines) then target civil infrastructure (hydro-electric generation, power lines, water supplies, telephone lines, roads and bridges) to isolate population centers and delay coalition forces. Once its conventional forces have been destroyed, the remaining elements will assume unconventional roles and continue to attack and resist coalition forces, while spreading the conflict into Border States.

i. Course of Action 1: Saturation – Overthrow GOY and Establish Provisional

Government: This COA will focus on the capital region and its densely inhabited valley in the northern central part of the country. Using military force to attacking the leadership of the GOY and its enabling communications, social and civil infrastructure. This COA will demand an overwhelming military strike to destroy Y’s leadership, its air force and immobilize its large and omnipresent military. The primary targets of this military action will be the leadership of GOY, its command and control structures and its fuel reserves. The primary objective of this course of action will be the government leadership in the capital region. The peripheral areas will have secondary planning priorities. Once the military has been neutralized, coalition forces will assume a nation-wide humanitarian support role to immediately distribute food throughout the nation and provide security. While military forces will support the civilian agencies in rebuilding Y, they will be prepared to conduct counterinsurgency operations should elements of the previous regime slip into guerilla operations.

COA 1 Over Throw GOY – Most Likely						
Intervener’s Action	GOY Reaction	People Reaction	Regional Reaction	Counter Action	Function	CCIR
Destroy GOY C2 over people throughout Y	Resist invasion, cut off energy supplies & attack neighboring states	Endure extreme hardships	Demand protection from coalition & spt coalition hesitantly	Show that GOY is a threat to its people & the region. Defend against GOY attacks	Diplo-Matic IO Milit-ary	Can they support economic, political & military action? For how long?

COA 1 Over Throw GOY – Most Dangerous						
Intervener’s Action	GOY Reaction	People Reaction	Regional Reaction	Counter Action	Function	CCIR
Destroy GOY C2 over people throughout Y	International protests, increased rationing & threaten neighboring states w/WMD	Endure extreme hardships	Blame coalition’s unprepared state for GOY attack & withdraw support	Destroy Y WMD & defend neighbor states w/increased # of forces	Diplomatic IO Military	What is Y’s status within the SCO? Other regional security organizations?

ii. Course of Action 2: Partial Occupation of Y – Establish Selected Safe Havens

within Y: This COA will require direct military action by the coalition to overwhelm GOY air defenses and ground forces around selected population centers near the periphery. The primary consideration in this course of action is to provide secure air and ground corridors for either the movement of supplies to selected population centers of Y, where a provisional government will start to rebuild the country. The focus of this COA will be to destroy GOY’s air force and neutralize or fix its ground forces in the capitol region. Once the outlying areas are secure and those population centers are getting adequate food and electricity, coalition IO campaign, the primary effort of this COA, will broadcast that success to the international community and the portions of Y still under GOY control. It will closely synchronize with diplomatic and economic efforts to force the GOY leadership to leave the country without significant bloodshed and destruction. This COA requires substantially less ‘up-front’ military capability from the coalition initially, but it must be expandable to a larger force capable of attacking the capital region, should the other coalition elements fail to bring GOY’s downfall.

COA 2 Partial Occupation – Most Likely						
Intervener’s Action	GOY Reaction	People Reaction	Regional Reaction	Counter Action	Function	CCIR
Seize portions of Y & conduct FHA ops	International protests, threaten attacks on neighboring states	Initially resist coalition invasion but then support it	Increase readiness & spt coalition actions	Show how people of Y respond positively to coalition action	Diplomatic IO Military	What will the IC do to help or hinder intervention?

COA 2 Partial Occupation – Most Dangerous						
Intervener’s Action	GOY Reaction	People Reaction	Regional Reaction	Counter Action	Function	CCIR
Seize portions of Y & conduct FHA ops	International protests, begin selective killing & attack neighboring states	Resist coalition efforts	Blame coalition’s unprepared state for GOY attack & withdraw support	Defend neighboring states & underscore that escalation is GOY’s decision	Diplomatic IO Military	Address significant regional security concerns. Orimpede in order to do it themselves.

iii. Course of Action 3: Attraction – Establish Safe Havens In Neighboring Countries.

Establish Safe Havens in neighboring states where people of Y could emigrate and find guaranteed food and shelter. Coordinate with such countries as willing to open borders for such an operation. This COA’s primary objective is defense of neighboring states from aggressive Y action and the establishment of secure areas for erecting camps and staging supplies in safe havens specifically for people of Y who refuse to starve. The coalition IO campaign will emphasize the purpose and capabilities of these camps throughout their construction and once these camps are complete and ready, the coalition will broadcast the stark contrast between the large stockpiles of supplies at these camps with the harsh desolation that the people of Y are enduring at the direction of their government. The IO campaign objective will be to combine with diplomatic and economic efforts to oust the GOY leadership without bloodshed. This COA will require significant defensive military capability by the coalition to deter GOY air or ground attacks near selected population centers along the country’s borders. However, this COA must be expandable to a larger military force.

COA 3 External Safe Havens – Most Likely						
Intervener’s Action	GOY Reaction	People Reaction	Regional Reaction	Counter Action	Function	CCIR
Establish refugee camps in neighboring states	International protests, increased rationing & threaten neighboring states	Endure continuing hardships & attempt to leave Y for camps	Increase readiness & open borders to refugee flow	Defend neighboring states from Y aggression & maintain camps	Diplomatic IO Military	Prevent/stop large cross border refugee flows. Address significant regional problem. Or impede in order to do it themselves

COA 3 External Safe Havens – Most Dangerous						
Intervener’s Action	GOY Reaction	People Reaction	Regional Reaction	Counter Action	Function	CCIR
Establish refugee camps in neighboring states	International protests, begin organized killing & attack camps in neighboring states	Endure increased repression & remain in Y	Increase readiness & spt coalition actions	Amplify that escalation is GOY’s decision	Diplomatic IO Military	Do other countries want this problem resolved? Will they fight as part of a coalition?

D. Course of Action Comparison

Intervention criteria were developed from COA narratives, Commander's Intent and Endstate descriptions. Higher numbers mean that COA best supports that objective. Tables are weighted by three primary criteria: 1) minimize risks to existing strategic relationships, 2) maintain coalition solidarity with neighboring states and 3) stop or minimize mass starvation in country Y

Criteria #1

Minimize Risks To Existing Strategic Relationships	Saturation	Partial Occupation	External Safe Havens
Lowest risk to Diplomatic/political Objectives	1 (Complete regime removal)	5 (Regime leadership hobbled, still in place)	3 (Regime in place)
Risk to regional alliances	1 (Greatest threat of regional conflict)	5 (Regime leadership still in place w/ significantly diminished military capability)	2 (Regime leadership still in place w/ slightly diminished military capability)
Spts Information Operations Theme (Help people of Y)	3 (Complete leadership removal may be insupportable)	4 (People under GOY starve while occupied areas are fed)	2 (Regime leadership still in place)
Effect on GOY control of people (food distribution)	4 (Complete leadership removal)	3 (Regime leadership still in place w/ loss of territory)	1 (Not illustrating contrasts or helping people)
Forcible entry & Lethal Force (high risk to coalition)	1 (Very high risk to coalition & border states)	3 (Coalition seizes least defended areas of Y)	5 (No direct attack on leadership. Defensive ops against Y attacks on neighboring states)
Logistics (slower build up = lower risks to coalition)	2 (Immediate build up is difficult)	3 (Longer lead time)	5 (Longest lead time)
Duration (shorter is lower risk to coalition)	5 (Relatively immediate regime change)	3 (Regime leadership challenged & diminished)	1 (Regime leadership still in place)
Intelligence (ability to confirm progress)	5 (Regime leadership is destroyed or scattered)	3 (Regime leadership still in place)	1 (Regime leadership even more deeply ensconced)
TOTAL	22	29	20

Criteria #2

Maintain Coalition Solidarity W/ Neighbor States	Saturation	Partial Occupation	External Safe Havens
Lowest risk to Diplomatic/political Objectives	5 (Complete regime removal)	4 (Regime leadership hobbled, still in place)	1 (Regime in place)
Risk to regional alliances (greater violence = greater risk)	1 (Greatest threat of regional conflict)	5 (Regime leadership still in place w/significantly diminished military capability)	1 (Regime leadership still in place w/slightly diminished military capability)
Spts Information Operations Theme (Help people of Y)	3 (Complete leadership removal would be welcomed by all)	5 (Neighbor states help people of Y)	2 (Displaced persons may pose threat to host nations)
Effect on GOY control of people (food distribution)	1 (GOY leadership will attack neighbor states if threatened)	3 (Regime leadership may still attack neighbor states)	2 (Neighbor states increase risks w/o helping people)
Forcible entry & Lethal Force (high risk to coalition)	1 (Very high risk to coalition & neighbor states)	2 (GOY has capacity to attack some neighbor states)	5 (GOY retains near complete capacity to attack neighbor states)
Logistics (slower build up = lower risks to coalition)	1 (Immediate build up gives neighbors least say)	3 (Longer lead time gives neighbors more say)	5 (Longest lead time gives neighbors most say)
Duration (shorter = lower political risk)	5 (Relatively immediate regime change)	3 (Regime leadership challenged & diminished)	1 (Regime leadership still in place w/increased tension)
Intelligence (ability to confirm progress)	5 (Regime leadership is destroyed or scattered)	3 (Regime leadership still in place w/fewer resources)	1 (Regime leadership even more deeply ensconced)
TOTAL	22	26	18

Criteria #3

Stop Or Minimize Mass Starvation In Country Y	Saturation	Partial Occupation	External Safe Havens
Completely Diplomatic/political Objectives	5 (Total regime removal)	3 (Regime leadership hobbled, still in place)	1 (Regime in place)
Risk to regional alliances	5 (GOY replacement government likely to be less confrontational)	1 (Regime leadership still in place & repressing significant number)	2 (Regime leadership likely to increase repression of people)
Spts Information Operations Theme (Help people of Y)	5 (Focus of all operations on the welfare of people of Y)	3 (People under GOY starve while occupied areas are fed)	1 (Regime leadership still in place)
Effect on GOY control of people (food distribution)	5 (GOY elements of repression removed)	3 (Bulk of population starving)	1 (No real impact)
Forcible entry & Lethal Force (high risk of repression increasing)	2 (Don't know degree that people will support intervention)	3 (Coalition liberates some areas of Y, while remainder under GOY control)	1 (Forces no change in GOY leadership – repression continues)
Logistics (faster build up = lower risks to people)	5 (GOY may not have time to intensify repression)	2 (Longer lead time allows greater GOY repression)	1 (Longest lead time allows largest increase of repression)
Duration (shorter = lower risk to people)	5 (Relatively immediate regime change)	2 (Regime leadership challenged & angry)	1 (Regime leadership unchanged & now threatened)
Intelligence (ability to confirm progress)	5 (GOY Regime leadership is destroyed or scattered)	3 (Regime leadership still in place)	1 (Regime leadership even more deeply ensconced)
TOTAL	37	20	9