

**MARO Project**  
**Scenario Number 1**  
**Mass Atrocity in Country X**  
**A Land-Locked Country in Sub-Saharan Africa**

**19 September 2009**

**MARO Project**  
**Mass Atrocity Response Operations**  
**COMMANDER'S ESTIMATE**

I. Commander's Estimate Mission Analysis

A. Facts relating to Mass Atrocity Response Operations in Sub Saharan Country "X"  
Scenario

1. Country X is land-locked.
2. Terrain is mostly grassy uplands with hills and numerous river valleys.
3. There are no major roads directly connecting the country with a large port.
4. 60 % of the population lives within 25 miles of the capital.
5. The remaining 40% population lives on hills throughout the country.
6. Most ground lines of communications (GLOC) are foot paths.
7. Country X has limited electrical power outside of the capital.
8. Country X has underdeveloped internal infrastructure.
9. There are fewer than 10 airports that could support military a/c operations.
10. Country X is a member of the African Union.
11. Government of Country X (GOX) did not assume power in transparent elections.
12. Country X's leading ethnicity has been in power for 20 years.
13. GOX is made up of a single ethnicity (Clan A).
14. GOX's Clan A believes current conflict is a civil war against Clan B.
15. GOX promotes the notion that Clan B is aligned with Western powers, and the civil war is a continuation of ending its past colonial occupation.
16. GOX has limited control of state media but will hinder outside reporting.
17. Internet access is available near the capital and nearly non-existent outside of it.
18. GOX maintains loose border controls.
19. GOX has an extensive informer network throughout the population.
20. GOX has a small conventional military, which is poorly trained, armed, and led.

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**B. Assumptions for Sub Saharan Country "X"**

1. Neighboring nations will allow US over flight, APOD and GLOC access.
2. Neighboring states will allow stockpiling of supplies to support the intervention.
3. Existing economic, diplomatic and cyber sanctions against GOX will remain in effect.
4. If this conflict slips into a mass atrocity, it will significantly increase the risk of regional instability.
5. International intervention will not substantially increase regional instability.
6. That the USG has established a coalition of partner nations should intervention be necessary.
7. Intervening coalition information operations will be able to shape international support for intervention before it starts.
8. Intervener IO will continue to isolate GOX from international community throughout the operation.
9. Intervener's IO will help solidify international support for preventative sanctions and active intervention if needed.
10. Combat operations will be authorized to stop atrocities committed by either ethnicity.
11. GOX will protest sanctions and intervention.
12. US military will lead a coalition of other nations determined to avoid mass atrocities and/or intervene to stop it.
13. Coalition nations will allow their forces to conduct offensive operations as well as defensive and stability operations.
14. That specific and coordinated ROE will be developed which reflect MARO-specific requirements for US Government agencies, law enforcement, coalition nations, and contracted support.
15. This operation will have a high priority for low demand/high density military assets.
16. Mass atrocity sites can be isolated by military means.
17. Organized military forces of X will not directly confront military forces during intervention.

**C. Mission Planning Parameters/Operational Factors/Perceptions/Considerations:**

**Preventive planning parameters:** In this situation, there is little time to deter the GOX from implementing a strategy of mass killings. Diplomatic efforts will work with information operations to continue to pressure the GOX prevent the killing. Perceptions of GOX's culpability and determination to kill the members of the other ethnicity must be at the heart of UN/US strategic communications. The combatant commander will synchronize military and information operations with DOS diplomatic and strategic communication efforts to clearly communicate to GOX the policy and intent of the USG and international community to prevent a mass atrocity. The combatant command will also work closely with DOS missions to foster with neighboring states the relationships which will lead to support for access, staging and long-term sustainment of the intervention operation and follow-on coalition efforts to intervene and rebuild Country X. As part of the information operations

perception development (and to lend credibility to the possibility of military action) the potential intervening nations may stage and exercise intervention forces in countries bordering Country X.

**Intervention planning parameters:** Should the GOX ignore the demands of the international community to stop pre-genocidal actions (Barbra Harff steps) protect its population, and continue actions that cause great harm to them, then a mandate will be imposed (by the UN or a reasonably representative organization) delineating economic sanctions and even authorizing military intervention should economic efforts seem ineffective. Should such a mandate fail to materialize, then other regional security organizations such as NATO and the AU will support and assist the operation, or at a minimum, not hinder it. Once operations are underway, it is imperative that the intervening force information operations continue to dominate the international community's perceptions.

1. Operational geo-strategic planning considerations for prevention or intervention operations
  - i. Access
    - a. Land-locked country in central Africa
    - b. Very limited road/rail/air infrastructure
    - c. Surrounding nations likewise have limited but slightly better transportation infrastructure to support intervention
    - d. Neighboring states are likely to condemn mass atrocities country X
  - ii. Terrain
    - a. Uninterrupted rolling hills with frequent river crossings and dense vegetation.
  - iii. Weather
    - a. Temperatures are typically tropical but cooler in the higher elevations
    - b. Seasons alternate between wet or dry
2. Prevention
  - i. Immediate Intervention Force (IIF) – prepared and staged to quickly intervene in a Country X, if so ordered to prevent a mass atrocity
    - a. This element might function as a small but potent symbol of intent to intervene and stand as a flexible deterrent option for policy makers at the operational or strategic level.
    - b. This element should be a combined arms force capable of placing infantry at tactically important areas of Country X. These elements must be scalable .... and have dedicated helicopter and fixed wing support. Inter-theater connectivity
    - c. Interveners will not contribute to regional instability.
  - ii. Sustainment and Response Force (SRF) – designated to protect the Stabilization Assistance elements, ensure the overall security of the area and provide quick response combat reinforcements as needed. Stop immediate human suffering and coordinate the initial response between intervention community.
    - a. This element functions as a larger reserve force if the smaller element is insufficient, or if the situation escalates toward a larger combat operation.

- b. This element must be correspondingly larger than the IIF, i.e. if the IIF FDO is company-sized, this must be a battalion. It should have mobility assets in order to project power over a broad area, and control key centers and points essential to preventing atrocities that are occurring or emerging.
  - iii. Stabilization Assistance Force (SAF) Sustainment – designed to provide combat service support to all force elements and emergency humanitarian assistance to the population affected by the atrocity. This element should be organized and equipped according to Country X’s hilly terrain and the dense vegetation.
3. Intervention
- i. Immediate Intervention Forces (IIF) – designated to immediately intervene in mass atrocities. This element can move very quickly to the areas where they are most needed in order to restrain GOX forces and supporting paramilitaries or secure an area for internally displaced persons.
    - a. Bolstered by a robust supporting arms component, the IIF can quickly overwhelm any opponent.
    - b. It must have a medical element to care for those wounded before and during intervention.
  - ii. Sustainment and Response Forces (SRF) – designated to protect the humanitarian assistance elements, ensure the overall security of the area and provide quick response combat reinforcements as needed
    - a. Provides immediate combat support to the IIF.
    - b. Controls movement within the area of operations.
    - c. Ensures security of victim and refugee encampments.
    - d. Lead coordinator for coalition political and military agencies.
  - iii. Stabilization Assistance Forces (SAF) – task organized to support immediate and prioritized large-scale medical, sanitary, infrastructure requirements
    - a. Provides immediate treatment for wounded and injured.
    - b. Provides sanitary and secure areas for intermediate medical facilities.
    - c. Functions as a coordinating element between the coalition's military and humanitarian NGOs operating in the area.
4. Mission Planning Perceptions
- i. How those doing the killing see the intervention:
    - Q. What do they think of the intervening forces?
      - A. The GOX will resist intervention politically, and may threaten to flood other countries with refugees that would quickly overburden and possibly destabilize those governments.
    - Q. Will they fight the intervening force or submit?
      - A. The military will not directly confront the intervening force, but they are likely to use paramilitary or use surrogate forces. They will be characterized by patient persistence. Surrogate forces will give GOX plausible denial.
    - Q. If GOX believes an intervention is eminent, what is it likely to do?

A. It will accelerate the killing in order to permanently alter the situation on the ground, by killing or ethnic cleansing members of Clan B, and to cover up its actions?

ii. What is the intervening community's IO theme?

a. Focus intervention IO campaign on favorably influencing the population of all the coalition's actions, while simultaneously discrediting the GOX.

Q. How do they identify those they would kill?

A. Clans are racially and linguistically similar, with small ethnic signatures

Q. How those being killed see the intervention?

A. They will support the intervention

Q. Will they automatically accept humanitarian support?

A. Yes

Q. What do they think of those attempting to kill them?

A. GOX is their unelected but sovereign government, whom they greatly fear and distrust

Q. How will we prevent them from immediate revenge actions?

A. Establish 'Truth and Reconciliation' councils immediately

5. Cultural Considerations

i. What can the intervening force do to facilitate reconciliation?

Employ bluff to bolster the possible intervention, even if the forces aren't immediately available. The intervening forces must use their knowledge of Country X's culture to threaten the GOX ethnicity with severe consequences if they do not stop the atrocities, assist international organizations in reconciliation efforts, and remand the incarcerated perpetrators to international justice commissions. How will the local respond to our intervention? This illustrates the complexities of the culture and region.

D. List Critical Variables from Joint Operating Environment

<b>Critical Variable 1</b>	<b>GOX &amp; aggressor group</b>	<b>Targeted Group</b>	<b>Intervention Force</b>	<b>By standers</b>		
<b>Geography and Physical Environment:</b> complex terrain urban settings, weather, topography, hydrology, and geography.	Terrain is difficult to farm and most of the population is dependent on subsistence farming & animal husbandry	Most people live in or near the capital. Those living outside the capital are scattered equally around the country	Intervention forces must secure GLOCs, primary roads & all useable airfields. Hilly terrain with dense vegetation will limit movement	Within The terrain is similar to that of its neighbors & doesn't play a significant role in	Observers calculations	<u>To the country</u>

<b>Critical Variable 2</b>	<b>GOX &amp; aggressor group</b>	<b>Targeted Group</b>	<b>Intervention Force</b>	<b>Observers</b>
<b>Nature and stability of the state:</b> How is a state strong; political leadership, military, police, or something else? Gives the planner insight towards the true aims of a GOX's actions	GOX controls the government but it is deeply corrupt & incompetent in nearly every aspect of governance & economy	Population is made up of two large but hostile tribes or ethnicities. In the past, both sides have committed atrocities against the other	Intervention forces should focus on discrediting GOX & aggressor group & disbanding the paramilitaries who are doing the bulk of the killing	Neighboring states have very little influence on the GOX & X has little influence on them.

<b>Critical Variable 3</b>	<b>GOX &amp; aggressor group</b>	<b>Targeted Group</b>	<b>Intervention Force</b>	<b>Observers</b>
<b>Culture</b> is a system of beliefs, values, etc common to that society. Understanding culture from the MARO perspective requires examining values, history, myths, & traditions that may combine to foster an MA	GOX & aggressor group uses ethnic rivalry & xenophobia as means to suppress dissent & threaten the other ethnicity	People of X are split along ethnic lines & these lines are rarely crossed. There are only slight differences between ethnicities which are mostly invisible to outsiders.	Intervening forces should attempt to understand the differences between ethnicities regardless of their subtleties as the other elements of the culture are same.	Counties around X are similar in culture & may be able/willing to help assist X climb out of its ethnic struggle.

<b>Critical Variable 4</b>	<b>GOX &amp; aggressor group</b>	<b>Targeted Group</b>	<b>Intervention Force</b>	<b>Observers</b>
<p><b>Sociological demographics:</b> contribute significantly to possible mass atrocities. Perceived inequities, ethnic, religious, etc, can breed envy and anger, which when combined social instability can lead towards an MA inducing environment.</p>	<p>GOX &amp; aggressor group is using the combination of historical oppression by former colonial powers &amp; economic suppression to conceal its own incompetence &amp; corruption from its people.</p>	<p>X has the highest density of any African country. In colonial days, the ethnicity now in power had low standing while ethnicity out of power ran the country. These memories are revived by the ruling ethnicity to distract attention from its failures.</p>	<p>Developing a reasonably stable population uninterested in seeking revenge for events now nearly 70 years old will commit the international community to a very long process.</p>	<p>The degree of commitment from international governing organizations and regional partners will be the key to the long-term success of the reconciliation and justice process.</p>

<b>Critical Variable 5</b>	<b>GOX &amp; aggressor group</b>	<b>Targeted Group</b>	<b>Intervention Force</b>	<b>Observers</b>
<p><b>Regional and global relationships:</b> political, economic, military, or cultural connections. May determine its internal/external support, motivation, and alliances, thereby increasing capability and broaden the scale of operations</p>	<p>X is a member the AU, but it has limited political, economic and military connections with any of its regional neighbors</p>	<p>The Targeted Group are not protected by regional interests. Regional leaders consider X's internal affairs to be none of their concern</p>	<p>The US Department of State has warned the Vice Chief of the Deputies Committee that it has not found any other nations willing to assist the US in intervening to prevent or stop a mass atrocity in X</p>	<p>No other nations have committed to joining any effort to stop mass atrocities in X.</p>

<b>Critical Variable 6</b>	<b>GOX &amp; aggressor group</b>	<b>Targeted Group</b>	<b>Intervention Force</b>	<b>Observers</b>
<b>Military capabilities:</b> ranging from conventional, developed irregular warfare and non state actors organizing militias, paramilitary, terrorists with niche technologies	GOX military is badly lead, poorly equipped and wholly incompetent. It will not stand against an intervention force of any quality. After the regime's removal, it's likely that the military will start IW ops against coalition forces.	Have no military resources, or training. Self-defense is limited to machetes & farm implements	Military intervention will require substantial rotary wing support & humanitarian capability. Intervention forces must be configured to intervene at mass atrocity sites w/HA & legal expertise immediately	Military capabilities of neighboring states are minimal & cannot be considered in planning for any military missions. Some support from these nations should only consider JRSO&I needs.

<b>Critical Variable 7</b>	<b>GOX &amp; aggressor group</b>	<b>Targeted Group</b>	<b>Intervention Force</b>	<b>Observers</b>
<b>Technology:</b> reflects sophistication within the operational environment which may erode the intervener's technological advantage.	They will have IT capabilities which they will use to tell their stories	They will have IT strengths to tell their stories	Must use technology to expose GOX's efforts at hiding its actions & illustrate GOX's repression of its people in every aspect of operations including diplomatic & economic	Include Diaspora The international community has sophisticated technological means of understanding the events in X, but it has little interest in the country or its affairs

<b>Critical Variable 8</b>	<b>GOX &amp; aggressor group</b>	<b>Targeted Group</b>	<b>Intervention Force</b>	<b>Observers</b>
<b>Information dissemination:</b> Various actors seek to use perception management to control and manipulate how the public sees things	Will try to hide its actions by denial & deceit. Intervening forces IO must monitor & immediately counter GOX propaganda	What do they have and how can we give them info and get it from them.	Vital to preventative actions, & keeping SA on developing mass atrocities, and the intervening forces focused on the reasons for intervention	Outside elements must be used to emphasize intervener's IO message over that of the GOXs

<b>Critical Variable 9</b>	<b>GOX &amp; aggressor group</b>	<b>Targeted Group</b>	<b>Intervention Force</b>	<b>Observers</b>
<b>External organizations:</b> affecting the conflict NGOs, humanitarian organizations, corporations, transnational organizations in the target country	GOX has severely restricted NGO movements within X. IGOs are restricted to capital	No reliable information on the peoples' attitude toward NGOs or IGOs exists	These organizations can significantly assist in understanding facts on the ground, before the intervention, what's going on during the MA and where evidence is hidden	As much as possible, planning must use these elements to amply the IO reasons for intervention & define transformation requirements

<b>Critical Variable 10</b>	<b>GOX &amp; aggressor group</b>	<b>Targeted Group</b>	<b>Intervention Force</b>	<b>Observers</b>
<b>National Will</b> encompasses values, morals, and effort of the population, the leadership and the military.	GOX & aggressor group runs the country. Elections are neither open nor transparent. They will struggle to keep power & keep their historical narrative alive	The Targeted Group has also kept their historical narrative alive & will not surrender that aspect of their culture & will take revenge where they can	GOX will pit the international community against the US using connections to the former colonial powers to diminish US national will	The IC is not sufficiently concerned about mass atrocities in X to intervene, but it will quickly criticize US efforts to do so

<b>Critical Variable 11</b>	<b>GOX &amp; aggressor group</b>	<b>Targeted Group</b>	<b>Intervention Force</b>	<b>Observers</b>
<b>Time</b> is a critical factor for setting tactical, operational, and strategic advantages. Perps will use the time between the initiation of an MA to intervention to shape the environment	GOX & aggressor group will attempt to delay intervention by any means possible while accelerating the paramilitaries doing the killing	The clan based victim groups are attempting to organize self defense forces against the perpetrators and are armed with wpns similar to them	Critical to recognizing the potential MA, organizing a coalition, setting FDOs and trip wires for intervention	No other nations have committed to joining an intervention effort as part of a coalition or unilaterally

<b>Critical Variable 12</b>	<b>GOX &amp; aggressor group</b>	<b>Targeted Group</b>	<b>Intervention Force</b>	<b>Observers</b>
<p><b>Economics:</b> Control of and access to natural or strategic resources can cause mass atrocity. Economic deprivation is also a major cause of mass atrocity. Perps may have economic superiority over vics for many reasons, including access to natural resources or power.</p>	<p>GOX has no economic control over X nor influence within the region</p>	<p>This ethnicity exists mostly by black market trading</p>	<p>Economic development will play a large role in X rebuilding and must be coordinated regionally as well as internationally.</p>	<p>Post conflict economic reconstruction should be shared with IGO/NGO &amp; international trade organizations as soon &amp; completely as possible</p>

## E. Drivers of Conflict Analysis

<b>Drivers of Conflict Analysis</b>	<b>GOX Ethnicity</b>	<b>Subordinate Ethnicity</b>	<b>Intervention Force</b>	<b>Observers</b>
<b>Context</b> – Context may create pre-conditions for conflict by reinforcing fault lines between communities	Continues to segregate & de-humanize the subordinate ethnicity in order to maintain political & social dominance	Continues to struggle under a system that demeans their social status & ultimately threatens to destroy them	International Community feels compelled to stop or prevent mass atrocity	International & regional support will depend on perception of the intervention as just or is another ‘neo-colonialist’ act
<b>Core grievances and sources of social/institutional resilience</b> – perceptions of a group’s specific need and faith government to consider those needs.	A long history of friction feeds perpetual conflict between clans that pre-dates colonial history. Now dominate ethnicity has control & power to ‘finish’ the other clan	The long history of discord between clans has seen both side dominate the other, but not to this degree since the pre-colonial days. They have no faith in governmental agencies	Understanding the history clarifies the type of relationship between clans while former colonial power w/in the coalition highlights potential problems of credibility	Ethnic friction may extend beyond X’s borders & complicate those govt’s willingness to assist intervention or prevention efforts
<b>Drivers of conflict and mitigating factors</b> – ‘The dynamic situation resulting from Key Actors’ mobilization of social groups around core grievances or around governmental restraints	GOX leadership incessantly presses their supporters w/images of the other clan as less than human & keeps social tension high.	Unrelenting GOX propaganda & control of most media prevent opposing clan’s key actor(s) from evolving. There are elements capable of resistance but lack resources or organizational capability	Intervention forces must make clear to all audiences what & how GOX is about to begin brutally killing the other clan. This is a vital element of the mission & answers the why question.	Intervention IO must be credible to international community & supporting regional powers. It must always be evident that the GOX is perpetrating a crime against ethnic opposition
<b>Windows of vulnerability and windows of opportunity</b> – ‘...moments when events threaten to rapidly and fundamentally change the balance of political or economic power.’	GOX will press intensely to maintain hold on power & economic control in order to move quickly in finishing off the other clan before IC can react	Must be ready supported by either arms given them or intervention forces prepared to go in	If the intervention forces are not prepared to stage quickly, it may be impossible to intervene before the killing starts. Intervention diplomatic efforts must ratchet up pressure on GOX immediately.	International community must support preventative diplomacy immediately. Then it must support intervention forces deployment to the region.

### F. Critical Capabilities & Vulnerabilities

	<b>GOX &amp; aggressor group</b>	<b>Targeted Group</b>	<b>Intervention Force</b>	<b>Observers</b>
<b>Critical Capability</b> — Considered a crucial enabler for a center of gravity to function as such and is essential to the accomplishment of the specified or assumed objective	Internal c2 of paramilitaries	Ability to organize resistance to government & defend selves	Use of deadly force, control of movement, military mobility and immediate reinforcements & medical support	Will to support or at least not hinder intervention
<b>Critical Requirement</b> — An essential condition, resource, and means for a critical capability to be fully operational	Unimpeded freedom of movement & absolute control over resources	Weapons & intelligence on paramilitary movement	National will supporting USG intervention	Belief that US should intervene w/o UN or other support
<b>Critical Vulnerability</b> — An aspect of a critical requirement which is deficient or vulnerable to direct or indirect attack that will	Control of airways & roads for paramilitaries	Lack of information about paramilitary movement & actions & wpns	Credibility of true purpose for intervening – to save lives	Belief that US intervention is credibly altruistic

create decisive or significant effects				
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G. Essential tasks necessary to accomplish the mission prioritized as Main, Supporting and Setting Conditions

Stage I, Intervention

**Main Operational Tasks**

1. Intervene directly to stop GOX supported/directed genocide
2. Protect vulnerable elements of population (refugees, IDP, women, children) (UJTL ST 6.2.6)
3. Protect key ethnic leaders resisting GOX actions (related to UJTL ST 6.2.6)
4. Locate and safeguard key witnesses, documents and other evidence related to key ongoing or potential U.S. investigations and prosecutions (UJTL ST 6.2.6)
5. Identify and detain GOX leadership (related to UJTL ST 4.4.3)
6. Secure military and paramilitary depots, equipment, ammunition dumps and means of communication (UJTL ST 6.2)
7. Immediately secure evidence of governmental direction of paramilitary organizations
8. Document and preserve evidence of mass atrocities and maintain data on sites (UJTL ST 6.2)
9. Ensure humanitarian aid and security force access to endangered populations and refugee camps (UJTL ST 8.2.8.3)
10. Establish IDP camps as necessary and provide basic stabilization assistance

**Supporting Operational Tasks**

1. Support the combat forces
2. Disarm GOX ETINCITY paramilitaries (Uniform Joint Task List ST 8.2.8.3)
3. Enforce ceasefires
4. Dismantle roadblocks and establish checkpoints (UJTL ST 1.6.1)
5. Monitor both ethnicities and preempt human rights abuses; implement effective warning mechanisms (UJTL ST 8.4)
6. Identify and neutralize potential spoilers (UJTL ST 8.2.8.3)
7. Engage ethnic forces capable of promoting immediate stability (UJTL ST 8.2.9)
8. Secure records, storage, equipment and funds related to criminal justice and security institutions (UJTL ST 6.2.6)
9. Ensure coordination with law enforcement components to deter violence
10. Reinforce IIF in combat operations as required
11. Protect vulnerable elements of population (refugees, IDP, women, children) (UJTL ST 6.2.6)
12. Locate and safeguard key witnesses, documents and other evidence related to ongoing or potential U.S. investigations and prosecutions (UJTL ST 6.2.6)
13. Identify and detain GOX ETINCITY leaders responsible for these offences (UJTL ST 4.4.3)
14. Assist in investigation, arrest, and transfer of suspected war criminals to international courts (UJTL ST 4.4.3)
15. Identify the critical information needed, where to find it, what are major gaps, and how to share, present and disseminate the information. If possible conduct this assessment in advance and identify the gaps in data, information and knowledge (UJTL ST 8.2.3)
16. Maintain freedom of movement and ensure open borders for potential refugees (UJTL ST 8.2.1)

17. Ensure humanitarian aid and security force access to endangered populations and refugee camps (UJTL ST 8.2.8.3)
18. Identify and coordinate emergency requirements (UJTL ST 8.2.4)
19. Establish and enforce weapons control regimes, including collection and destruction (UJTL SN 9.3)
20. Ensure freedom of movement (UJTL ST 1.6.1)
21. Establish and disseminate rules relevant to movement (UJTL ST 1.6.1)
22. Control crowds, prevent looting and manage civil disturbances (UJTL ST 4.4.3)
23. Protect and secure critical infrastructure, natural resources, civil registries, property ownership documents (UJTL ST 6.2)
24. Protect places of religious worship and cultural sites (UJTL ST 6.2)
25. Protect private property and factories (UJTL ST 6.2)
26. Establish border security, including customs regime to prevent arms smuggling, interdict contraband (i.e., drugs and natural resources), prevent trafficking of persons, regulate immigration and emigration, and establish control over major points of entry (UJTL ST 8.2.1)
27. Perform civilian police functions including investigating crimes and making arrests (UJTL ST 4.4.3)
28. Supervise incarceration processes and transfer to prison facilities (UJTL ST 4.4.3)
29. Secure records, storage, equipment and funds related to criminal justice and security institutions (UJTL ST 6.2)
30. Ensure adequate protection and monitoring (UJTL ST 8.4)

#### **Setting Conditions for the Next Stage**

1. Protect civilian stabilization and reconstruction personnel (UJTL ST 6.2.6)
2. Protect contractor and NGO stabilization personnel and resources (UJTL ST 8.2.11)
3. Conduct emergency de-mining and UXO removal (UJTL ST 8.2.13)
4. Mark mine fields (UJTL ST 8.2.13)
5. Identify, secure and preserve evidence of war crimes, crimes against humanity, corruption, and transnational crimes, including terrorism, organized crime, financial crimes, trafficking in humans and narcotics (UJTL ST 6.2)
6. Inventory courts, law schools, legal libraries, and bar associations (UJTL ST 8.2.3)
7. Inventory police stations, police mobility capabilities, police communications systems, data management systems and police headquarters (UJTL ST 8.2.3)
8. Collect information that can provide operational or programmatic information (e.g., logistical access routes; "who's doing what where"; program/financial needs of organizations; who are other donors) (UJTL ST 8.2.11)
9. Collect information for background knowledge (e.g., history; geography; population demographics and composition; baseline health indicators; political and economic structure and status; infrastructure; and culture of the country) (UJTL ST 2.4.1.1)
10. Assess and secure access to valuable natural resources (UJTL ST 6.2)
11. Continue to assess for most serious environmental hazards (e.g., lead, mercury, dioxin) (UJTL ST 8.4)
12. Safeguard/mitigate most dangerous health hazards (UJTL ST 8.4)
13. Provide sufficient external medical support while integrating indigenous expertise (UJTL ST 8.2.4)

14. Ensure adequate health, food provisions, and security for entire population (UJTL ST.8.2.4)
15. Restore essential local public services (UJTL ST 8.2.4)
16. Coordinate efforts, as feasible, with UN, regional organization and NGOs (UJTL ST 8.2)

### Stage II, Transformation

#### **Main Tasks**

1. Establish and control buffers (UJTL ST 8.2.8.3)
2. Continue provision of protection and assistance to IDPs in camps, homestays and communities (UJTL ST 8.4)

#### **Supporting Tasks**

1. Continue provision of protection and assistance to IDPs in camps, homestays and communities (UJTL ST 8.4)
2. Establish and maintain order in refugee camps (UJTL ST 8.4)

#### **Setting Conditions**

1. Continue to assess for most serious environmental hazards (e.g., lead, mercury, dioxin) (UJTL ST 8.4)
2. Support and enforce political, military, and economic arrangements (UJTL ST 8.2.6)
3. Continue to analyze information in context; relate to other thematic information; evaluate issues and responses; make projections about the future; recommend policies and actions
4. Provide sufficient external medical support while integrating indigenous expertise (UJTL ST 8.2.4)

### Stage III, Fostering Sustainability:

#### **Main Tasks**

1. Rebuild indigenous capacity to protect infrastructure & maintain positive relations with indigenous population (UJTL ST 8.2.2)
2. Institutionalize civic education into the formal school system
3. Provide logistical support for elections (ballot boxes, voting stations, etc.) if required (UJTL ST 8.4)
4. Transfer monitor requirements to indigenous security institutions (UJTL ST 4.4.3.1)
5. Establish military-to-military programs with the host country's forces ST (UJTL ST 8.2.1)
6. Support conventional military assistance programs (UJTL ST 8.2.1)

#### **Supporting Tasks**

1. Transfer responsibilities to HN, IGOs & NGOs
2. Support transition to HN redevelopment
3. Redeploy forces

### H. Identify the end states

Mass atrocities are prevented or stopped, GOX ETINCITY leaders responsible for atrocities are deposed and/or in US custody for criminal proceedings, injured are receiving medical care, societal reconciliation underway, US military forces deployed & USG has requisite expertise in place to assist newly regenerating GOX ETINCITY has the capability/capacity to sustain progress toward a just, safe and prosperous society.

	<b>GOX &amp; aggressor group</b>	<b>Targeted Group</b>	<b>Intervention Force</b>	<b>Observers</b>
End state	force GOX to be accountable	protected from future atrocities and immediate humanitarian need met./	Mass atrocities are stopped or minimized, wounded are given aid, conditions are set for long-term effort for transition to ...	Political & economic broad continuing support for continuing intervention force and prevention of future recurrence .

#### J. State the mission

The USG and those members of an intervening coalition will conduct operations in Country X to prevent and stop mass genocide, isolate GOX leadership, impede or destroy its control and connections to paramilitary organizations committing mass atrocities, protect the non-ruling ethnicity of X while preventing revenge killings, provide security for the flow of humanitarian aid and provide a secure environment facilitating the political, economic and social reconstruction of X.

#### K. Commander's Intent

The Command and those nations prepared to assist, will support diplomatic and economic means to prevent or with military force intervene, to stop the GOX's from killing its opposing ethnicity. The Command will assist the USG to then establish an environment conducive to social healing and reformation of the country. This will be accomplished with the use of force to stop the killing, and establish an environment allowing USG expertise to assist X in rebuilding social connections, establishing economic viability, and founding a reconciliation commission to end the destructive effects of the historical myths that generate intolerance and demonize the other ethnicity. The Command will support the USG's efforts to coordinate country X's re-entry in to regional security organizations and to develop economic and diplomatic relations between themselves and X to broader, more prosperous level.

L. Commander's Critical Information Requirements: Strategic, Political, Economic, Military, Geographic/Meteorological, and Infrastructure Factors

Strategic Factors	GOX & aggressor group	Targeted Group	Intervention Force	Observers
Are vital strategic US interests at risk?	No	No	What is the ultimate USG objective?	Will any other nations provide economic/political/military support? For how long/where?
What IGOs/NGOs are in-country? And doing what?	Very limited to a few cities because of extreme violence on the roads	Are people receiving aid from IGOs/NGOs? Are they capable of helping IGO forces?	Authorized/not authorized to help UN/NGOs? What assistance can interveners provide?	Is any country capable/willing to help provides security support to IGO/NGOs?
Strategic Risks of Action	Will GOX actions be ignored, thus rewarded?	Will suffering go unnoticed, and for how long?	Will US international reputation suffer from inaction?	Do other countries want this problem resolved? Will they fight as part of a coalition?
When to prevent or intervene	What early-warning indicators informed the USG of GOX intent, and actions?	How do people know what's coming? What are they doing to prepare?	How will Command coordinate military FDOs w/ USG compellence efforts & IO campaign?	What will the IC do to help prevent mass atrocity or hinder intervention?

Political Factors	GOX & aggressor group	Targeted Group	Intervention Force	Observers
Who are the major political players?	Name/position/background/& where do they draw political strength?	Name/position/background/relationship to GOX & from where do they draw political strength?	Other elements of USG who will coordinate broader governmental efforts at prevention & intervention	Name/position/background
What do they perceive as the problem	How do they communicate? What are they saying? Why have they chosen a strategy of mass violence to resolve the problem?	How do they communicate? What are they saying? Do they have any political recourse with GOX?	How deep is the domestic political will to sustain intervention & hand over? Does the IC support intervener's actions seem likely at all?	How is the country regionally/internationally regarded?
When should we talk to them?	As soon as possible, & we should warn them of the personal dangers of proceeding with MA	Now!	As we plan, allot, coordinate, stage & exercise military intervention forces with humanitarian supplies	During the compellance phase & before the intervention phase. Then throughout the entire operation
Where are they & how can we talk to them?	Capital of X, UN mission & international for a	As they are scattered throughout the country, any broadcast means available will work	Who should talk to whom? How to do it?	Can we convince them to act as intermediary? Do we know if they are acting in good or bad faith?
Why should/shouldn't we prevent or intervene?	GOX will continue to brutally kill the opposing ethnicity w/o IC interference	A brutal mass atrocity is likely to occur as the world watches.	Political risks of inaction outweigh physical/political risks of intervention & long term involvement	Prevent/stop large cross border refugee flows & possible regional instability

Economic Factors	<b>GOX &amp; aggressor group</b>	<b>Targeted Group</b>	<b>Intervention Force</b>	<b>Observers</b>
Does the US have strategic economic relationships w/country/aggressors?	No	None	How could the USG facilitate some economic connection to X?	Can the region provide an economic incentive? Is preventing mass atrocity as important to them?
Are sanctions viable?	No, as X has virtually no economic connection to the IC	Sanction will have virtually no effect on the opposing ethnicity's circumstance	How credible will sanctions be depends on export/import potential to the US & world economy	Will border states assist USG in developing economic incentives?
How could it re-join the international community?	Reconciliation & reintegration would have to start anew – there is no past history	Reconciliation & reintegration would have to start anew – there is no past history	How credible is the USG commitment to fostering sustainability?	How could RSOs help integrate X into the community of nations?

Military Factors	<b>GOX &amp; aggressor group</b>	<b>Targeted Group</b>	<b>Intervention Force</b>	<b>Observers</b>
Pol/Mil C2	Who are the leaders? How do they communicate? Where are they?	Who are the resistance leaders? How do they communicate? Where are they?	How much USG will exists to sustain intervention & hand over?	How can the USG help X regain status within any regional security organizations?
Military Capability	What exactly can they do? Where is it? Can we get at it?	Can they defend themselves?	Will any other nations join the USG effort?	Will they assist intervening forces?
Post Conflict Security environment	How to reconcile and reintegrate the two tribes into a stable military?	How to reconcile & rebuild trust ?	How to secure a just & stable environment	Do they have long-term will & capability to assist sustainment?

Geographic & Meteorological Factors	<b>GOX &amp; aggressor group</b>	<b>Targeted Group</b>	<b>Intervention Force</b>	<b>Observers</b>
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Prevention	Helps GOX ability to mask actions	Hinders ability to underscore atrocities against them	May complicate ISO efforts to build situational awareness	Plays no role in regional considerations
Intervention	How does GOX use environment to hide actions	Will the topography help or hinder their efforts?	Will initially demand significant fixed & rotary wing spt	Can bring aviation spt to coalition?

Infrastructure Factors	GOX & aggressor group	Targeted Group	Intervention Force	Observers
Prevention	GOX controls paramilitary movement within GOX	Have very limited mobility	Effects specific intervention plans (category & amount of engineering support)	Have effective border control & support refugee camps
Intervention	GOX may destroy vital infrastructure during intervention	People must either walk to aid or have aid brought to them	Can spt immediate direct intervention or slow build up of force in some areas	Willingness to join intervention efforts?

#### M. Prioritized Constraints/Restraints

##### **Constraints (What must be done)**

1. Coordinate with economic and diplomatic efforts at prevention and intervention
2. Maintain coalition solidarity with neighboring states
3. Stop or minimize mass atrocities in Country X
4. Prevent GOX leadership from escaping responsibility
5. Secure specific APODs and GLOCs within X on order
6. Keep IC apprised of coalition actions in contrast to those of GOX
7. Promulgate how the GOX is intentionally killing its people
8. Defend citizens of X traveling to and inside refugee camps
9. Defend either ethnicity from revenge killings

##### **Restraints (What must NOT be done)**

1. Alienate international community by USG actions
2. Instigate regional instability
3. Jeopardize US political will
4. Strengthen GOX information operations

#### N. Commander's Planning Guidance

1. Intelligence preparation of the theater of operations/JOA must include a cultural analysis with specific focus on the relationship between either ethnicity. We must know:
  - i. How the GOX is sustaining/encouraging the mass atrocities
  - ii. What GOX has to gain from the results/outcome of a mass atrocity.
  - iii. The degree and nature of GOX control of the paramilitaries and police.
2. Address how we can tailor our information operations to assist in:
  - i. Changing the GOX's decision to kill the opposing ethnicity
  - ii. Encouraging resistance to the GOX paramilitaries and to support intervention
  - iii. IO campaign must underscore the brutality of the atrocities committed by GOX supported paramilitaries
3. Address how our intervention might strengthen or weaken regional organizations will to join or otherwise support USG efforts.
4. Address how neighboring countries/groups could benefit from the peaceful existence of X and how that harmony could benefit regional stability.
5. Answer the question, what is the short, mid, and long term cost of not intervening?
6. The Government of X has an action advantage over the USG until it can intervene; therefore all COAs must address how quickly we can effectively establish a sustainable, credible, armed presence in X. Our response force must be strategically and operationally agile and have a significant tactical mobility and force protection advantage over GOX led paramilitaries. We must also obtain and keep information supremacy over GOX and its paramilitaries.
7. Consider the following concepts for COA development:
  - i. A compellance COA that maximizes the use of precision lethal and non-lethal fires, with SOF DA/SR/terminal guidance teams, to destroy selected perpetrator assets and disrupts command and control. Support this with shaping information operations. This COA must be supported by analysis that shows the GOX is susceptible to this form of coercion.
  - ii. A COA that saturates threatened areas with small operating bases that assure local security. This COA must include a strong reserve/reaction force.
    - a. Assume permissive entry: thus all the preceding ground intervention COAs will consider the use of humanitarian and non-lethal fires as a precursor to the entry of land forces.
  - iii. A COA that establishes safe havens throughout the country.
  - v. All COAs will focus on feeding and protecting the people and establishing sufficient security to enable mission handover to regional/international for long term stability operations.
  - vi. All COAs will assume that USG diplomatic efforts will ultimately develop a stabilization force and engage regional/international efforts to sustain stability and a reconciliation process.

## II. Courses of Action (COAs) Development

### A. GOX Courses of Action

1. Prevention Phase: GOX will use its control of paramilitaries to accelerate genocide against the opposing ethnicity. It will likely increase the ruthlessness of its already deeply inhuman treatment of those people. It will work diligently to convince its own ethnicity that the US only wants to destroy their unique culture and cares nothing for their historic suffering during colonial times. To the international community, GOX will continually broadcast its victimization at the hands of another powerful colonial ruler. Using international venues, X will decry the intervention as a neo colonial violation of its sovereignty and attempt to undermine the mandate against them as unjust and racially driven.

2. Intervention Phase: GOX cannot resist military intervention conventionally. It will increase repression and accelerate the killing while working assiduously to deny and conceal its actions. Once its paramilitary forces have been routed, the remaining elements may assume unconventional warfare roles and continue to resist coalition forces, while taking opportunities to continue killing the opposing ethnicity.

### B. Coalition Courses of Action Narratives

#### 1. Prevention

##### i. Course of Action 1: Compel GOX to stop killing and end mass atrocities.

Compel GOX to allow NGOs and IGOs complete and unfettered access to all parts of the country. This is the primary preventative COA. Its duration will be defined by moment when the USG authorizes action against GOX. Flexible deterrent options linking diplomatic efforts, economic sanctions and overt military actions will be coordinated with concerned regional security organizations, with the intent to increase tension on the GOX if it does not stop the killing. The military component of that coordination and build up will be the deployment and staging of coalition military power to levels obviously capable of intervening. Information operations will focus on illustrating to the international community the stark contrast between the USG's reasonable demands and the pathological determination of GOX to kill its people. Should the GOX not respond to this course of action, the USG will be prepared to launch an intervention operation against the GOX to stop or mitigate mass atrocities against the opposing ethnicity.

<b>COMPELLENCE</b>	<b>GOX &amp; aggressor group</b>	<b>Targeted Group</b>	<b>Intervention Force</b>	<b>Observers</b>
Spt Diplomatic/political	Will oppose & attempt to undermine	Must know that their safety is the focus of intervention efforts	FDOs are arrayed to support this COA by increasing pressure on GOX	Broadens basis for potential international & non-regional spt to USG action
Impact on regional alliances	Will oppose the foundation of any regional alliance	N/A	Spts potential coalition development & preps for military intervention	As X is not a regional player, it is hard to estimate the effects of intervention on the region
Information Operations	Absolute rejection of intervention & calls on its ethnicity to accelerate the killing	Focus on freedom of movement, & personal safety any where in X	Must persuade GOX to stop and IC to support GOX's dismissal by whatever means required	Illustrate potential regional harmony if GOX were less dangerous
Effect on GOX control of paramilitary organizations	Will accelerate GOX's direction to accelerate the killing	May convince Targeted Group to fight GOX paramilitaries	Understand how GOX controls paramilitary movement & targets	Neighbor states are not concerned with either ethnicity's dominance
Forcible entry & Lethal Force requirements	Some individual resistance, but no large scale organized resistance	N/A	Give impression of determination to use lethal force to remove GOX leadership	Most likely would not support forcible entry
Logistics	Supplies to paramilitaries are in established caches throughout X	May know the cache sites.	Force deployment & staging adds credit to consequences of non-compliance	If compensated they will allow staging & integration operations
Duration	Will accelerate the killing in order to avoid intervention	Longer=more dead Shorter=fewer dead	Starts w/ USG determination & ends on order to intervene	The longer the better for neighboring nations
Intelligence	GOX intell to gauge coalition credibility	Targeted Group is the object of intervention	Focus on GOX leadership & paramilitary c2	Develop spt bases & HA requirements.

## 2. Intervention

i. Course of Action 1: Saturation – Overthrow GOX and Establish Provisional Government: This COA will focus on the most densely populated areas of the country. Using military force to contain the leadership of the GOX and shatter its communication and control of paramilitaries nationwide, the USG will quickly isolate mass atrocity sites and preserve all evidence. This COA will require a significant aviation support to move the intervening forces any where in the country very quickly. The primary targets of this military action will be the leadership of GOX, its command and control structures and its weapons caches. This COA will also entail significant humanitarian operations to immediately provide security throughout the nation. While military forces will support the civilian agencies in rebuilding X, they will be prepared to conduct counterinsurgency operations should elements of the previous regime initiate guerilla operations.

<b>SATURATION/REPLACE GOX</b>	<b>GOX &amp; aggressor group</b>	<b>Targeted Group</b>	<b>Intervention Force</b>	<b>Observers</b>
Spt Diplomatic/political effort	Will oppose & attempt to undermine	Will attempt to voice support for intervention	FDOs are arrayed to support this COA by showing the degree of mass atrocities in X	Broaden potential regional spt for USG action
Impact on regional alliances	No effect	N/A as there will not be large refugee flow	Neighboring states have no objection to US staging or presence, if compensated	None, but could be politically hindered by AU if ignored
Information Operations	Absolute rejection of intervention & calls on international community to condemn US while accelerating killing	Focus on safety & freedom of movement	Must persuade GOX to stop and IC to support GOX's dismissal by whatever means required	Underscore the potential regional prosperity of a harmonious X nation
Effect on GOX control of paramilitaries	May accelerate GOX's killing efforts	May use weapon caches for revenge killing	Complete destruction of GOX/paramilitary connection	Neighbor states are not concerned with either ethnicity's dominance
Forcible entry & Lethal Force requirements	Unlikely to resist forcible intervention	Significant humanitarian support required	Give impression of likelihood of using lethal force to intervene	Coordinate development of ROE within potential coalition
Logistics	Weapons caches are in place & efforts to hide atrocities ready	Significant humanitarian support required	Use neighboring states to receive, stage & integrate US forces	Allows regional coordination for potential planning & operations
Duration	Will continue killing anywhere US forces are absent	Shorter is better for Targeted Group	Starts w/ USG order & will end quickly	International community, RSOs, etc. have say in duration
Intelligence	GOX intell will try to gauge USG vulnerability to IO efforts	Focus on reconciliation	Focus efforts on killing sites, LOCs, camp sites & resistance leadership	Develop spt networks for X & est. HA requirements.

ii. Course of Action 2: Partial Occupation of X – Establish Selected Safe Havens within X: This COA will require initial military action by the USG to place ground combat forces around selected population centers around the country. The primary objective of this course of action is to provide secure ground corridors for the movement of supplies and people throughout the country to large populations in areas with the highest incidents or likelihood of atrocities in fact or potential. As these outlying areas are secured and those population centers are getting adequate security and medical care, the USG IO campaign will broadcast that success to the international community. The IO campaign is the main effort of this COA and it will be closely synchronized with diplomatic efforts to illustrate to the international community how the GOX & aggressor group has devastated the country and must be held responsible for its actions. COA requires substantially less aviation and humanitarian support initially, but it must be expandable to a slightly larger combat force to secure and hold additional areas and to bring more humanitarian supplies to those new places as well. The selection of the initial safe havens will be done in coordination with NGOs already in place at various locations and will ask their cooperation to increase USG knowledge of geography and culture as the secure areas expand to the entire country.

<b>PARTIAL OCCUPATION</b>	<b>GOX &amp; aggressor group</b>	<b>Targeted Group</b>	<b>Intervention Force</b>	<b>Observers</b>
Spt Diplomatic/political	Will oppose & attempt to undermine	Recognized spokesmen may voice spt	Develop selection criteria using demographics, MA sites, GLOC, & NGO placement	Develop potential for international & regional organizations
Strengthen regional alliances	Will oppose & attempt to fracture	May try to get support from neighboring states	Spts gradual coalition formation & preps for intervention	Lays foundation for new relationships or strengthens extant ones
Information Operations	Absolute rejection of intervention & calls on people to resist	Focus on safety from paramilitaries.	Must persuade GOX to stop and IC to support GOX's dismissal by whatever means required	Underscore purpose of USG operations & potential of peaceful country X
Effect on GOX control of paramilitaries	May accelerate GOX's repressive measures	May help ethnicity to organize self defense forces	Complete disruption in controlled areas & set example for GOX controlled areas	Neighbor states refuse to harbor paramilitary leadership or troops
Lethal Force requirements	Cannot resist in conventionally – may initiate IW using paramils	Will spt any intervention	Underscore ability to use lethal force, while prime effort is humanitarian	Coordinate development of ROE w/in supporting nations
Logistics	Has cashed weapons throughout the country	May uncover caches & inform USG or use wpns angst paramils	Lighter initial demands for JROS & I in neighboring states	Allows for potential coalition development & support for new GOX
Duration	Will attempt to delay expansion of USG controlled areas	Will attempt to accelerate USG controlled areas	Starts w/ USG order, ends w/ order to expand control to entire country	International community, RSOs, etc. should be informed of US success
Intelligence	GOX intell may target USG forces & spt elements	Gauge degree of ethnic spt for USG action	Focus on NGO locations, GLOCs, & resistance leadership	Develop spt networks for X & HA requirements.

iii. Course of Action 3: Attraction – Establish Safe Havens In Neighboring Countries.

Establish Safe Havens in neighboring states where the Targeted Group could emigrate and find guaranteed food and shelter. Coordinate with those countries willing to open their borders for such an operation. This COA's primary objective is defense of neighboring states from aggressive X action and the establishment of secure areas for erecting camps and staging supplies in safe havens specifically for Targeted Group. The coalition IO campaign will emphasize the purpose and capabilities of these camps throughout their construction and once these camps are complete and ready, the coalition will illustrate the stark contrast between the safety and medical attention available in these camps with the images of brutal suppression and likely atrocities visited on the Targeted Group still within X. The IO campaign objective will be to combine with diplomatic efforts to end the killing and oust the GOX & aggressor group without bloodshed. This COA will require limited defensive military capability by the USG to deter GOX ground attacks on neighboring states' borders. Furthermore, this COA must be expandable to a larger military force capable of roles described in COAs 1 and 2, depending on the political situation and reports from within X.

<b>EXTERNAL SAFE HAVENS</b>	<b>GOX &amp; aggressor group</b>	<b>Targeted Group</b>	<b>Intervention Force</b>	<b>Observers</b>
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Spt Diplomatic/political	Will oppose & attempt to undermine	Will attempt to emigrate to camps	FDOs spt this COA by putting pressure on GOX & coordinating w/neighbors	Broadens basis for international mandate & non-regional spt to coalition obj.
Strengthen regional alliances	Will oppose & attempt to fracture	Will hope to be welcomed	Spts faster coalition building & preps for military intervention	Lays foundation for new relationships or strengthens extant ones
Information Operations	Absolute rejection of intervention & calls on dominate ethnicity to resist others emigration	Focus on food & shelter available in camps. Underscore GOX brutality	Must persuade GOX to stop and RSO to spt GOX's dismissal by whatever means required	Argue for potential coalition & broadens IC support, & preps for military intervention
Effect on GOX control of paramilitaries	May accelerate GOX's repressive measures	May develop self protection skills & wpns	No direct impact on paramilitaries – largely dependent on IO	No safe havens for GOX leadership post operations
Lethal Force requirements	May threaten neighboring states, but has no military capability	Develop wpns skills	Minimal required from USG. Defensive forces for camp security	Requirement to coordinate ROE w/in potential coalition
Logistics	Will deny food & freedom of movement	Seize paramilitary caches	Force deployment & staging may bring neighboring states into a coalition	Allows potential coalition coordination, & planning
Duration	Will delay formation of potential support to USG action	The longer they are away from their homes, the harder it is	Starts & ends with USG order	International community, RSOs, could help determine duration
Intelligence	GOX intell will try to gauge coalition credibility for forcible action	Gauge degree of ethnicity's freedom of movement	Focus efforts on LOCs, camp sites & Targeted Group leadership	Develop spt networks for X, est. alternate camp sites & HA requirements.

### C. Course of Action Wargaming

1. Prevention: GOX will use its control of the various paramilitaries and to either speed up the killing process or push the Targeted Group out of the cities into the country-side or out of the country entirely. It will work diligently to convince the international community that the USG is merely another large colonial power seeking to destroy the country leading ethnicity just as the previous colonizer did. During the prevention phase of the operation, GOX will likely accelerate its preparations for killing or the actual atrocities themselves while covering up its actions through their limited control of the media or by denying outside media opportunities to report. It may also excoriate neighbor states for assisting the US by supporting the build up of forces or building refugee camps. If the latter course is obvious, the GOX will threaten neighboring states with overwhelming numbers of refugees who will be in ‘temporary’ camps for a very long time.

Once the intervention is launched, GOX will not resist US forces conventionally as it has a very limited military capacity. It may order its paramilitary units to an irregular warfare status and attempt to interdict and harass USG, NGOs, IGOs and the Targeted Group targets as opportunities arise.

COA 1 Compellence – Most Likely						
Intervener’s Action	GOX Reaction	Targeted Group	Regional Reaction	Counter Action	Function	CCIR
Demand GOX end persecution & killing Targeted Group	International protests, increased repression	Demand GOX removal, w/pns to defend self & spt from outside X	Spt USG build up and allow refugee camps	Amplify that escalation is GOX’s decision & USG wants killing to stop	Diplomatic IO	What will the IC do to help to spt intervention or develop a coalition to assist?

COA 1 Compellence – Most Dangerous						
Intervener’s Action	GOX Reaction	Targeted Group	Regional Reaction	Counter Action	Function	CCIR
Demand GOX end persecution & killing Targeted Group	Accelerate killing, threaten neighbor states w/large DP flows	Quickly leave or die in large numbers	Demand US not intervene & withdraw spt	Stage forces for intervention as quickly as possible	Military w/dip spt	Can USG alone support political & military action? For how long?

2. Intervention: GOX has no capability to resist forcible intervention. Its first priority will likely be to accelerate the killing, destroy evidence, and avoid any international criminal proceedings. It will likely lose control over paramilitary forces almost immediately and those elements may individually assume unconventional roles and

continue to attack and resist US forces, while as they continue to kill members of the Targeted Group, conceal their actions and spread the conflict into neighboring states.

Course of Action 1: Saturation – Overthrow GOX and Establish Provisional

Government: This COA will focus on the most densely populated areas of the country. Using military force to contain the leadership of the GOX and shatter its communication and control of paramilitaries nationwide, the USG will quickly isolate mass atrocity sites and preserve all evidence. This COA will require a significant aviation support to move the intervening forces any where in the country very quickly. The primary targets of this military action will be the leadership of GOX, its command and control structures and its weapons caches. This COA will also entail significant humanitarian operations to immediately provide security throughout the nation. While military forces will support the civilian agencies in rebuilding X, they will be prepared to conduct counterinsurgency operations should elements of the previous regime initiate guerilla operations.

COA 1 Over Throw GOX – Most Likely						
Intervener's Action	GOX Reaction	Targeted Group	Regional Reaction	Counter Action	Function	CCIR
Destroy GOX C2 over people throughout X	Resist invasion, cut off energy supplies & attack neighboring states	Endure extreme hardships	Demand protection from coalition & spt coalition hesitantly	Show that GOX is a threat to its people & the region. Defend against GOX attacks	Diplo-Matic IO Military	Can they support economic, political & military action? For how long?

COA 1 Over Throw GOX – Most Dangerous						
Intervener's Action	GOX Reaction	People Reaction	Regional Reaction	Counter Action	Function	CCIR
Destroy GOX C2 over people throughout X	International protests, increased rationing & threaten neighboring states w/WMD	Endure extreme hardships	Blame coalition's unprepared state for GOX attack & withdraw support	Destroy X WMD & defend neighbor states w/increased # of forces	Diplomatic IO Military	What is X's status within the SCO? Other regional security organizations?

ii. Course of Action 2: Partial Occupation of X – Establish Selected Safe Havens

within X: This COA will require initial military action by the USG to place ground combat forces around selected population centers around the country. The primary objective of this course of action is to provide secure ground corridors for the movement of supplies and people throughout the country to large populations in areas with the highest incidents or likelihood of atrocities in fact or potential. As

these outlying areas are secured and those population centers are getting adequate security and medical care, the USG IO campaign will broadcast that success to the international community. The IO campaign is the main effort of this COA and it will be closely synchronized with diplomatic efforts to illustrate to the international community how the GOX & aggressor group has devastated the country and must be held responsible for its actions. COA requires substantially less aviation and humanitarian support initially, but it must be expandable to a slightly larger combat force to secure and hold additional areas and to bring more humanitarian supplies to those new places as well. The selection of the initial safe havens will be done in coordination with NGOs already in place at various locations and will ask their cooperation to increase USG knowledge of geography and culture as the secure areas expand to the entire country.

COA 2 Partial Occupation – Most Likely						
Intervener's Action	GOX Reaction	Targeted Group	Regional Reaction	Counter Action	Function	CCIR
Seize portions of X & conduct FHA ops	Protest to IC, repress & conceal evidence of atrocities	Resist GOX repression or emigrate to US controlled areas	Increase spt for US actions	Show how Targeted Group respond positively to coalition action	IO Diplomatic Military	What will the IC do to help or hinder intervention?

COA 2 Partial Occupation – Most Dangerous						
Intervener's Action	GOX Reaction	Targeted Group	Regional Reaction	Counter Action	Function	CCIR
Seize portions of X & conduct FHA ops	Protest to IC, & accelerate killing	Begin large scale revenge killing	Blame US for needlessly ratcheting up tension & withdraw support	Expand areas under US control & show that escalation is GOX's decision	Military IO Diplomatic	How much more quickly can we be ready to intervene across X?

iii. Course of Action 3: Attraction – Establish Safe Havens In Neighboring Countries.

Establish Safe Havens in neighboring states where the Targeted Group could emigrate and find guaranteed food and shelter. Coordinate with those countries willing to open their borders for such an operation. This COA's primary objective is defense of neighboring states from aggressive X action and the establishment of secure areas for erecting camps and staging supplies in safe havens specifically for Targeted Group. The coalition IO campaign will emphasize the purpose and capabilities of these camps throughout their construction and once these camps are complete and ready, the coalition will illustrate the stark contrast between the safety and medical attention available in these camps with the images of brutal suppression and likely atrocities visited on the Targeted Group still within X. The IO campaign objective will be to combine with diplomatic efforts to end the killing and oust the GOX & aggressor group without bloodshed. This COA will require limited defensive military capability by the USG to deter GOX ground attacks on neighboring states' borders. Furthermore, this COA must be expandable to a larger military force capable of roles described in COAs 1 and 2, depending on the political situation and reports from within X.

COA 3 External Safe Havens – Most Likely						
Intervener's Action	GOX Reaction	Targeted Group	Regional Reaction	Counter Action	Function	CCIR
Establish refugee camps in neighboring states	Protest to IC & continue repression while prepping for atrocities. Threaten neighboring states	Endure continuing hardships & attempt to leave X for camps	Increase spt to US & open borders to refugee flow	Defend neighboring states from X aggression & maintain camps	Diplomatic IO Military	Prevent/stop large cross border refugee flows. Address significant regional problem.

COA 3 External Safe Havens – Most Dangerous						
Intervener's Action	GOX Reaction	Targeted Group	Regional Reaction	Counter Action	Function	CCIR
Establish refugee camps in neighboring states	International protests, begin killing & attack camps in neighboring states	Large numbers emigrate to neighboring states immediately	Blame US for massive overflow of camps & human misery	Prepare to expand camps & intervene w/in X immediately	Diplomatic Military IO	Do other countries want this problem resolved?

### D. Course of Action Comparison

Intervention criteria were developed from COA narratives, Commander's Intent and Endstate descriptions. Higher numbers mean that COA best supports that objective. Tables are weighted by three primary criteria: 1) stop or minimize mass atrocities in Country X, 2) minimize risks to US credibility and 3) develop regional consensus for the future of X

#### **Criteria #1**

<b>Stop Or Minimize Mass Atrocities In Country X</b>	<b>Saturation</b>	<b>Partial Occupation</b>	<b>External Safe Havens</b>
Lowest risk to Diplomatic/political Objectives	<b>5</b> (Complete regime removal)	<b>3</b> (Regime leadership hobbled, still in place)	<b>1</b> (Regime in place)
Risk to Regional Stability	<b>5</b> (Virtually no risk to region – if quick)	<b>2</b> (Regime leadership still in place w/ control over paramilitaries)	<b>1</b> (Regime leadership still in place & Targeted Group repressed)
Spts Information Operations Theme (Stop mass atrocity)	<b>5</b> (Complete leadership removal is feasible)	<b>3</b> (People in GOX areas are repressed while those in US occupied areas are safe)	<b>1</b> (Regime leadership still in place & Targeted Group repressed)
Effect on GOX control of paramilitaries	<b>5</b> (Leadership removal = no paramilitary control)	<b>1</b> (Regime leadership still in place w/ loss of territory)	<b>1</b> (No impact on paramilitaries)
Lethal Force (high risk to IO campaign)	<b>2</b> (US must force carefully to maintain balance)	<b>3</b> (US seizes some of X)	<b>1</b> (No direct attack on leadership. Defensive ops against X attacks on neighboring states)
Logistics (slower build up = higher risks to Targeted Group)	<b>4</b> (Immediate build up is better)	<b>2</b> (Longer lead time)	<b>1</b> (Longest lead time)
Duration (shorter is lower risk to Targeted Group)	<b>5</b> (Relatively immediate regime change)	<b>2</b> (Regime leadership challenged but in power)	<b>1</b> (Regime leadership still in place & Targeted Group repressed)
Intelligence (ability to confirm progress)	<b>5</b> (Regime leadership is destroyed or scattered)	<b>2</b> (Regime leadership still in place)	<b>1</b> (Regime leadership even more deeply ensconced)
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>36</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>8</b>

**Criteria #2**

<b>Minimize Risks To US Credibility</b>	<b>Saturation</b>	<b>Partial Occupation</b>	<b>External Safe Havens</b>
Lowest risk to Diplomatic/political Objectives	<b>5</b> (Complete regime removal)	<b>3</b> (Regime leadership hobbled, still in place)	<b>1</b> (Regime in place)
Risk to Regional Stability	<b>5</b> (Virtually no risks to the region)	<b>2</b> (Regime leadership still in place w/partial control over paramilitaries)	<b>1</b> (Regime leadership still in place w/undiminished control of paramilitaries)
Spts Information Operations Theme (Stop mass atrocity)	<b>5</b> (Incomplete US effort would be unhelpful to IO campaign)	<b>3</b> (Neighbor states help Targeted Group)	<b>2</b> (Displaced persons may pose threat to host nations)
Effect on GOX control of paramilitaries	<b>5</b> (GOX leadership is gone thus no paramilitaries)	<b>3</b> (Regime leadership may still attack neighbor states)	<b>1</b> (None)
Lethal Force (high risk to IO campaign)	<b>3</b> (High risk to US IO campaign)	<b>2</b> (GOX still in power & attacking Targeted Group)	<b>1</b> (GOX retains complete control over paramilitaries while Targeted Group is repressed)
Logistics (slower build up = lower risks to coalition)	<b>5</b> (Immediate is better for US credibility)	<b>3</b> (Longer lead time gives GOX more time)	<b>1</b> (Longest lead time gives GOX advantage)
Duration (shorter = lower political risk)	<b>5</b> (Relatively immediate regime change)	<b>2</b> (GOX leadership challenged, but still in power)	<b>1</b> (Regime leadership still in place w/increased regional tension)
Intelligence (ability to confirm progress)	<b>5</b> (Regime leadership is destroyed or scattered)	<b>3</b> (Regime leadership still in place w/fewer resources)	<b>1</b> (Regime leadership even more deeply ensconced)
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>38</b>	<b>21</b>	<b>9</b>

**Criteria #3**

<b>Develop Regional Consensus For The Future Of X</b>	<b>Saturation</b>	<b>Partial Occupation</b>	<b>External Safe Havens</b>
Completely Diplomatic/political Objectives	<b>5</b> (Total regime removal)	<b>3</b> (Regime leadership hobbled, still in place)	<b>1</b> (Regime in place)
Risk to Regional Stability	<b>5</b> (GOX replacement government likely to be accepted w/in region)	<b>1</b> (Regime leadership still in place & threatening neighboring states)	<b>1</b> (Regime leadership likely to increase threat to neighboring states)
Spts Information Operations Theme (Stop mass atrocity)	<b>5</b> (Focus of all operations on the welfare of Targeted Group)	<b>3</b> (Some people are safe while others are not. Will US do partial measures?)	<b>1</b> (Regime leadership still in place & now threatening neighboring states)
Effect on GOX control of paramilitaries	<b>5</b> (complete removal of GOX & paramilitaries)	<b>3</b> (GOX could order paramilitaries to attack neighboring states)	<b>1</b> (No real impact)
Lethal Force (high risk to IO campaign)	<b>3</b> (Avoid violent spillover into neighboring states)	<b>2</b> (Coalition liberates some areas of X, while remainder under GOX control)	<b>1</b> (Neighboring states supporting US operations while GOX threatens them)
Logistics (faster build up = lower risks to people)	<b>5</b> (GOX may not have time to intensify repression)	<b>2</b> (Longer lead time allows greater GOX to raise tension)	<b>1</b> (Longest lead time allows GOX to raise regional tension)
Duration (shorter = lower risk to people)	<b>5</b> (Relatively immediate regime change)	<b>2</b> (Regime leadership challenged & angry)	<b>1</b> (Regime leadership unchanged & now threatening)
Intelligence (ability to confirm progress)	<b>5</b> (GOX Regime leadership is destroyed or scattered)	<b>3</b> (Regime leadership still in place)	<b>1</b> (Regime leadership even more deeply ensconced)
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>38</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>8</b>